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INESCAPABLE SURVEILLANCE
Matthew Tokson †

Until recently, Supreme Court precedent dictated that a person waives
their Fourth Amendment rights in information they disclose to another
party. The Court reshaped this doctrine in Carpenter v. United States,
establishing that the Fourth Amendment protects cell phone location data
even though it is revealed to others. The Court emphasized that consumers
had little choice but to disclose their data, because cell phone use is virtually
inescapable in modern society.
In the wake of Carpenter, many scholars and lower courts have endorsed
inescapability as an important factor for determining Fourth Amendment
rights. Under this approach, surveillance that people cannot feasibly escape
receives more Fourth Amendment scrutiny, while surveillance that can be
avoided receives less, or none.
This Article offers the first systematic analysis of inescapability in Fourth
Amendment law. It challenges the prevailing wisdom that inescapability is a
desirable or workable basis for Fourth Amendment protection. Inescapability
does not provide a conceptually coherent standard for courts to apply. It
incentivizes consumers to forego beneficial technologies, creating substantial
social harms. It fails to adequately protect the most sensitive forms of
personal information. It creates doctrinal confusion and ignores established
precedents that contradict the inescapability model.
Moreover,
inescapability analysis elides individual differences—technologies that are
avoidable for most people may be unavoidable for others, including the
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disabled, the poor, and other disadvantaged populations.
Inescapability threatens to limit privacy rights to a narrow set of digital
technologies while making a mess of Fourth Amendment doctrine. This
Article analyzes these issues in depth and explores several alternatives for
determining Fourth Amendment protections in the digital age.
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INTRODUCTION
Many modern technologies gather information about their users. 1
These technologies are often hard to avoid. Computers, the internet, and cell
phones are ubiquitous and play an important role in most people’s lives. 2 Yet
many technologies are far less essential. Consider the Furbo, an interactive
camera device that allows pet owners to remotely launch treats at their pets
by pressing a button on their cell phones. 3 The Furbo may be useful for pet
owners, but owning one is not a necessity of modern life.
This distinction between avoidable and unavoidable technologies arose
recently in a landmark Fourth Amendment case involving cell phone location
data. In Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that
government officials must get a warrant before obtaining cell phone location
data that would allow them to track users’ movements over time. 4 The Court
found that people have no choice but to disclose their location data, because
cell phone use is virtually “inescapable” in modern life. 5 Accordingly, users

See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of
Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 812–18 (2016).
2
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (discussing the central
importance of cell phones to modern life); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484
(2014) (noting that cell phones are a “pervasive and insistent part of daily life”);
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–36 (2017) (describing the
importance of the internet and social media to core First Amendment activity).
3
FURBO DOG CAMERA, https://shopus.furbo.com/ [https://perma.cc/GYZ5GWZJ?type=image] (last visited July 28, 2020). The Furbo also enables owners to
communicate with their pets via a two-way audio system. Id. The latest version of the
Furbo can capture videos whenever pet activity is detected and store those videos in the
cloud. Id. It analyzes these videos using artificial intelligence and sends text alerts to
owners regarding their pets’ activities. Id. The Furbo records video and sound from the
inside of owners’ homes on a “24 hours event-based” protocol, potentially capturing
sensitive data about the owner and their activities inside their home. See id. It also has
several benefits, including the ability to monitor one’s pet and to detect intruders or other
emergencies. Id.
4
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.
5
Id. at 2223. Moreover, cell phone data is transmitted automatically when a phone is in
use, without any input or permission from the user, making it impossible for even
sophisticated users to escape the disclosure of their information. Id. at 2220.
1

1

DRAFT - Forthcoming, 105 Cornell Law Review __ (2021)

do not voluntarily give up their information—and they retain a Fourth
Amendment right in their cell phone location data. 6 The Court also reasoned
that cell phone tracking reveals sensitive personal information and collects a
great deal of data about people’s lives.7
Carpenter was a huge development in Fourth Amendment law. 8 For the
first time, it declared that the Fourth Amendment protected location data
even if that data had been exposed to another party. 9 This raised the
possibility that other forms of personal data disclosed to private parties might
be protected as well.10 This category includes nearly every form of digital
information: websurfing data, emails, texts, search terms, app usage, video
and audio recordings, medical and fitness information, smart home data, and
much more.11 Whether such data is ultimately protected may depend on
whether its disclosure is “inescapable.” 12
In the wake of Carpenter, many lower courts have applied an
inescapability standard, attempting to determine whether the digital
surveillance at issue in a case was avoidable. 13 Several scholars have endorsed

Id. at 2220.
Id. at 2217–18.
8
See generally Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 357,
358 (2019) (contending that Carpenter represents a sea change in Fourth Amendment law
governing new technologies).
9
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (“Given the unique nature of cell phone location records,
the fact that the information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s
claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”); cf. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 721
(1984) (finding no Fourth Amendment search when agents used a beeper to monitor a
truck on public highways); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (“A
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements from one place to another,” because he “voluntarily conveyed to
anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was travelling over particular roads in a
particular direction.”).
10
See Ohm, supra note 8, at 378–385.
11
See id.; Matthew Tokson, The Emerging Principles of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 88
GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
12
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
13
See, e.g., United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019); Naperville Smart
Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 2018); United States
v. Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d 357, 358–59, 365–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); United States v. Maclin,
393 F. Supp. 3d 701, 708 (N.D. Ohio 2019); United States v. Diggs, 385 F. Supp. 3d
6
7

2
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inescapability as an important factor for determining Fourth Amendment
protection, along with the revealing and extensive nature of the surveillance
at issue. 14 Others have argued that inescapability should be an absolute
requirement for the Fourth Amendment to apply. 15 While disagreements
remain, early interpretations of Carpenter generally place inescapability at the
center of Fourth Amendment privacy going forward. 16
This Article challenges the idea that inescapability is a coherent or
normatively defensible basis for Fourth Amendment protection.
Inescapability has several theoretical and practical flaws that existing accounts
of the concept have overlooked. This Article offers the first detailed analysis
of this new concept, exploring its theoretical underpinnings, its doctrinal
structure, and its policy implications. It finds that the use of inescapability
as a Fourth Amendment standard would lead to serious administrability
problems and the underprotection of privacy in personal electronic data. The
Article examines these issues in depth and interrogates the prevailing wisdom
that inescapability is a viable model for Fourth Amendment law.
Inescapability is conceptually ambiguous. It cannot be taken literally,
because virtually all information disclosures are escapable with sufficient
effort. Internet data, for instance, can often be kept from third-party
observation by using widely available software or by opting out of
information collection. 17 Consumers can also bargain for greater privacy

648, 660–61 (N.D. Ill. 2019); United States v. Tolbert, No. 14-3761-JCH, 2019 WL
2006464 (D.N.M. May 7, 2019); United States v. Therrien, No. 2:18-CR-00085, 2019
WL 1147479 (D. Vt. Mar. 13, 2019); State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278, 288 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2019); State v. Leonard, 923 N.W.2d 52, 57 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019). For
additional cases and discussion, see infra subpart I.D.
14
See, e.g., Aaron L. Dalton, Carpenter v. United States: A New Era for Protecting Data
Generated on Personal Technology, or a Mere Caveat?, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 1, 23
(2018); Ohm, supra note 8, at 376–78.
15
See Orin S. Kerr, Implementing Carpenter, in THE DIGITAL FOURTH AMENDMENT
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 20), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3301257
[https://perma.cc/RUR4-2JBU].
16
See infra subparts I.C–I.D; see also Evan Caminker, Location Tracking and Digital Data:
Can Carpenter Build a Stable Privacy Doctrine?, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 411, 451 (noting
residual uncertainty about the role of inescapability while emphasizing its importance).
17
See infra notes 100–104 and accompanying text.

3

DRAFT - Forthcoming, 105 Cornell Law Review __ (2021)

protections, at least in theory. 18 Even when applied nonliterally, an
inescapability standard puts individuals asserting privacy rights at a strategic
disadvantage. 19
Further, a more nuanced inescapability standard would be difficult to
apply accurately. Courts could try to determine precisely how escapable a
given technology is, granting protection whenever avoiding the technology is
sufficiently difficult. But this would be an ambiguous and fact-heavy inquiry,
with results that would change over time as technologies and social practices
change. Such a standard would make adjudication more costly and less
predictable while offering little offsetting benefit.20 Adding to the confusion,
it would also conflict with longstanding precedents still in force. 21
The society-wide scope of the inescapability inquiry also threatens to
overlook individual differences among users. A technology that most people
can easily escape may be inescapable for others. For example, while
ride-sharing apps might be avoidable for most people, they may be
indispensable for disabled persons or those who cannot afford a car and lack
access to public transit. 22 Failing to take individual differences into account
is a serious flaw in existing concepts of inescapability. Yet varying Fourth
Amendment protection among individuals based on their unique
circumstances is not viable either—it would create massive administrability
problems for courts and legal actors.
Concerns about inescapability extend beyond these conceptual and
practical issues. Perhaps most seriously, an inescapability standard creates
socially harmful incentives. It motivates consumers to avoid escapable
technologies that collect information, lest they lose their privacy rights. But
those technologies are often beneficial, and incentivizing people to avoid
them creates substantial social harm. Optional technologies such as smart
devices, dating apps, and navigation services can confer potentially enormous

See infra notes 105–107 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 108–109 and accompanying text.
20
See infra notes 118–120 and accompanying text.
21
See infra subpart II.D.
22
See infra section II.A.3.
18
19

4

DRAFT - Forthcoming, 105 Cornell Law Review __ (2021)

benefits on their users. 23 Deterring consumers from using such technologies
would be disastrous. Yet if consumers continue to use these technologies,
they may face comprehensive government surveillance unchecked by the
Fourth Amendment.
This is especially concerning because inescapability fails to protect many
forms of sensitive information. Optional technologies frequently capture
intimate forms of data. Internet connected beds, wearable devices, and other
“smart” items can record and transmit deeply personal details about people’s
lives. 24 DNA analysis services, dating apps, and other optional services can
obtain sensitive information about an individual’s biological and
psychological traits. 25 An inescapability standard may leave this data exposed,
while often requiring a warrant for far less sensitive data. 26 Inescapability fails
to draw a normatively defensible line between protected and unprotected
forms of digital information.
In light of these issues, this Article examines several alternative
approaches that avoid reliance on inescapability. When the Supreme Court
addresses the Fourth Amendment again, it might overtly reject inescapability
and embrace factors like the intimacy, amount, and cost of surveillance,
which find ample support in prior Fourth Amendment cases. 27 Or, it might
adopt a more novel approach. In recent years, scholars have proposed looking
to positive law, survey data, historical practice, or normative balancing in
order to draw the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment. This Article
analyzes these approaches and finds that most of them offer a more coherent
and protective standard than inescapability.
In the meantime, lower courts applying Carpenter can plausibly
See infra subpart II.B. Even the Furbo dog camera has substantially benefitted
homeowners and their pets in some situations, including break-ins and medical
emergencies. Furbo’s Barking Alerts Save Dogs from Fires and Gas Leaks, FURBO,
https://shopus.furbo.com/pages/save-dog-lives [https://perma.cc/MP6QGE7M?type=image] (last visited July 28, 2020).
24
See infra notes 155–158 and accompanying text.
25
See infra notes 140–144, 158 and accompanying text.
26
See infra subpart II.C.
27
See Tokson, supra note 11, at 13–26 (analyzing the more universal principles of intimacy
of information sought, amount of information sought, and cost of surveillance).
23
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minimize inescapability, while focusing on the other important factors
identified in Carpenter—the revealing and extensive nature of surveillance.28
Indeed, some lower courts have already begun to do so. 29 This interpretive
process can help shape Supreme Court doctrine and point the way toward a
more effective standard for Fourth Amendment protection. 30
Part I of the Article describes the doctrinal and theoretical foundations
of inescapability. It discusses the Carpenter case and examines how scholars
and lower courts have endorsed inescapability as a determinant of the Fourth
Amendment’s scope. Part II challenges the premises of inescapability,
detailing the conceptual, practical, and normative weaknesses of an
inescapability standard. It also describes the doctrinal conflicts and the
socially harmful incentives that inescapability would create. Part III analyzes
several potential alternative regimes for setting the boundaries of the Fourth
Amendment. It offers a roadmap for lower courts to minimize the use of
inescapability when applying Carpenter and explores how both courts and
scholars can effectively shape Fourth Amendment law going forward.

I.

T HE RISE OF INESCAPABILITY

This Part tracks the emergence of inescapability as a determinant of
Fourth Amendment protection. Doctrinal concepts of privacy and voluntary
disclosure laid the foundations for inescapability. The Supreme Court then
analyzed inescapability in a landmark case involving cell phone tracking.
Many scholars and lower courts have since adopted the concept of
inescapability in applying the Fourth Amendment to new surveillance
technologies. This Part examines each of these developments in turn.
A. The Third-Party Doctrine
The Supreme Court has held that a Fourth Amendment search occurs
See infra subpart III.A.
See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
30
See infra notes 197–206.
28
29

6

DRAFT - Forthcoming, 105 Cornell Law Review __ (2021)

when a government official physically intrudes on certain types of property 31
or violates a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” 32 The Court has
not clearly explained what makes an expectation of privacy reasonable, and it
has given several conflicting interpretations of the standard. 33 It has been
relatively clear, however, in addressing data that individuals reveal to other
parties. In the 1970s, the Court developed the “third-party doctrine,” which
provides that a person waives their Fourth Amendment rights in information
they voluntarily disclose to a third party. 34 For example, the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to the phone numbers that a person dials,
because they have disclosed those numbers to the phone company. 35 The
See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7–10 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400,
404-06 (2012). The physical intrusion test has so far added little to the reasonable
expectation of privacy test, and the Supreme Court cases where it has been used may have
come out similarly under Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Jardines, 569 U.S. at
12–16 (Kagan, J., concurring); Jones, 565 U.S. at 418–31 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
32
This standard is often referred to as the Katz test, having first appeared in Justice
Harlan’s concurrence in 1967’s Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. at 361. The Court has not
fully defined the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy, and scholars have
interpreted the standard in different ways. See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth
Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 508 (2007) (positing that the Court applies
multiple, conflicting models of the Fourth Amendment in different cases); Tokson, supra
note 11, at 12 (contending that the Court applies an intuitive model of Fourth
Amendment searches that looks to the intimacy, amount, and cost of the surveillance
practice at issue).
33
Kerr, supra note 32. In some cases, the Court looks to the probability that a person’s
privacy will be violated. Id. at 508–10. In others, it looks to other sources of law, to the
private nature of the thing searched, or to the policy implications of the surveillance. Id. at
512–22.
34
Cases holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to statements made to an
undercover officer predate the reasonable expectation of privacy test, although the thirdparty doctrine itself was not established in its full form until the 1970s. See Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (concluding that a list of dialed phone numbers
was not protected by the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
444–45 (1976) (holding that a bank customer had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
his records because they were disclosed to third-party employees); Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (ruling that testimony regarding statements to a secret
government informant was allowable under the Fourth Amendment); Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427, 437–40 (1963) (holding that an electronic recording device that was
not unlawfully planted by physical invasion did not violate defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights).
35
Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–46.
31
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police can accordingly obtain a list of anyone’s dialed numbers without a
warrant or probable cause.
The concept of voluntary disclosure is central to the third-party
doctrine.36 The earliest third-party doctrine cases involved suspects
voluntarily sharing details of their crimes with government informants or
undercover agents. 37 The Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not
protect a person who “voluntarily confides his wrongdoing” to another. 38
The Court then expanded the doctrine to cover financial records and phone
numbers disclosed to businesses. 39
In the internet era, the third-party doctrine threatens to eliminate
privacy protections for a vast swath of personal information, including web
surfing data, cloud-stored documents, medical and biometric data, and
location information. 40 These and many other forms of digital information
are regularly disclosed to third-party service providers. 41 Accordingly,
government investigators may be able to obtain enormous quantities of
personal information without a warrant. 42

Id. at 742−45; Miller, 425 U.S. at 435, 442; United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749
(1971) (plurality opinion).
37
White, 401 U.S. at 746–47; Lopez, 373 U.S. at 428–29.
38
White, 401 U.S. at 749 (quoting Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302).
39
Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (“All of the documents obtained, including financial statements
and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed
to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”). Likewise, telephone customers,
who know that telephone companies receive and record the numbers they dial, voluntarily
disclose those numbers to their service provider and therefore waive any Fourth
Amendment right in the numbers. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (“When he used his phone,
petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and
‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so
doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he
dialed.”).
40
See, e.g., Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV.
581, 585 (2011) (noting that third-party doctrine precedents are problematic in an age
where individuals store enormous amounts of personal information on various third-party
platforms).
41
See id.; see also Tokson supra note 11, at 53.
42
Such data is regularly stored in databases and made available to the government upon
request or subpoena. See Tokson, supra note 40, at 585.
36

8

DRAFT - Forthcoming, 105 Cornell Law Review __ (2021)

The third-party doctrine has been widely criticized, 43 and the Supreme
Court has not applied it in a case since 1979. 44 Several states have repudiated
the doctrine via constitutional or statutory law, 45 and Justice Sotomayor
criticized it in an influential concurrence in United States v. Jones. 46 Yet most
lower courts continued to vigorously enforce the doctrine in cases involving
email to/from data, IP addresses, cell phone data, and more. 47 As government
surveillance of digital information held by third parties proliferated, it
became clear that the Supreme Court would have to reexamine the
third-party doctrine and its application to new technologies. 48
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 151–64 (2007) (critiquing the
third-party doctrine in the context of third-party subpoenas); Jack M. Balkin, The
Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2008)
(characterizing Fourth Amendment protections for personal data as weak due to the
third-party doctrine); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment:
Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV.
975, 976–77 (2007) (contending that the third-party doctrine is one of the most serious
threats to privacy in the digital age); Neil Richards, The Third-Party Doctrine and the
Future of the Cloud, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1441, 1475–80 (2017) (asserting that the
third-party doctrine as applied in a digital context undermines the core values of the
Fourth Amendment).
44
Smith, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
45
See Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth
Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable
Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 395–405 (2006) (reporting numerous states that have
rejected the third-party doctrine in whole or in part, including California, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania, among others).
46
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). In Jones,
the Court held that attaching a GPS tracking device to the underside of a car was a Fourth
Amendment search that required a valid warrant. Id. at 404.
47
See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615
(5th Cir. 2013) (ruling that cell site data is not protected under the Fourth Amendment);
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 330–31 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that the
third-party doctrine applies to e-mail metadata such as to/from addresses); United States v.
Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that email to/from addresses and IP
addresses are not searches according to the third-party doctrine); Freedman v. Am. Online,
Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174, 182–83 (D. Conn. 2005) (holding that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in AOL subscriber information when the user permitted AOL to
release the information to third parties).
48
See generally Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth
Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431, 432–33 (2013) (recounting
43

9
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B. Carpenter and Cell Phone Tracking
Several times per minute, a cell phone emits radio waves that
communicate with the antennae on cell phone towers. 49 Cell phone
companies generally track which antennae and which towers receive a cell
phone’s signal. By doing so, they can generate a record of the user’s location
over time. They collect and store this data for various purposes, including
network maintenance and applying roaming charges. They also sell this data
to third parties for use in marketing and analytics. 50
Over the past two decades, law enforcement officials have frequently
sought to obtain cell phone location data for use in criminal investigations. 51
Lower courts mostly approved this tactic, holding that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to such data because users had knowingly exposed
it to their cell phone companies. 52 Scholars and other observers were alarmed,
raising concerns about pervasive, low-cost location tracking by the
government.53 After several federal appeals courts had weighed in, the
Supreme Court decided to review a case where the government used cell

the history and application of the third-party doctrine and speculating that the changing
nature of technology will require the Supreme Court to limit or avoid the doctrine).
49
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211–12 (2018).
50
See id. For further discussion of cell site location information (CSLI) and cell phone
provider data retention practices, see Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 139, 160−61 (2016).
51
See Tokson, supra note 50, at 159.
52
Indeed, the federal courts of appeal were virtually unanimous in declaring that cell phone
location information could be obtained without a warrant. See, e.g., United States v.
Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d
498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc); In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site
Data, 724 F.3d 600, 612 (5th Cir. 2013). But cf. In re Application of U.S. for an Order
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d
304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that “it is unlikely that cell phone customers are aware
that their cell phone providers collect and store historical location information” while
resolving the case based on a statutory interpretation influenced by constitutional analysis).
53
Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law,
Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 709 (2011); Tokson, supra note 50, at 183; Who Has Your
Back?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., (2013), https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back2013?support_whyb=1&social=1 [https://perma.cc/8DPV-X8YQ].
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phone location data to place a suspect at the scene of several robberies. 54
In Carpenter v. United States, the Court held that the government’s
warrantless acquisition of Carpenter’s cell phone location data violated the
Fourth Amendment. 55 The Court expressly limited the third-party doctrine,
making it inapplicable to cell phone location data stored by a third party.
Cell phone tracking was so revealing, detailed, and low in cost that it
“implicate[d] privacy concerns far beyond” those considered in previous
cases. 56 Tracking a cell phone for long periods of time provides an
all-encompassing record of an owner’s activities. 57 It opens an “intimate
window into a person’s life,” potentially revealing his familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations.58 Such tracking is also
“remarkably easy, cheap, and efficient,” capable of accessing vast repositories
of personal data at little cost to government inspectors. 59
Moreover, the surveillance at issue was practically “inescapable.” 60 Cell
phones have become “such a pervasive . . . part of daily life that carrying one
is indispensable to participation in modern society.” 61 And cell phones
transmit location data to service providers automatically, such that users have
no opportunity to opt out. Accordingly, cell phone users do not voluntarily
give up their information—they have no real choice but to disclose their
location data to their service providers. Indeed, there was no feasible way to
avoid the technology or to use it differently that would allow people to escape
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212–13.
Id. at 2221, 2223.
56
Id. at 2220. Cell phone records contain vast stores of historical location data and
potentially allow the police to track suspects “every moment of every day for five years.”
Id. at 2218. Virtually every American could be tracked at any time. Id. (“Critically,
because location information is continually logged for all of the 400 million devices in the
United States—not just those belonging to persons who might happen to come under
investigation—this newfound tracking capacity runs against everyone.”). And the cost of
such monitoring had drastically decreased, removing an important barrier to excessive
location tracking by the government. Id. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 429 (Alito, J., concurring)).
57
Id. at 2217.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 2217−18.
60
Id. at 2223.
61
Id. at 2220 (internal quotation marks omitted).
54
55
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disclosure. 62 For all of these reasons, the Court declined to extend the
third-party doctrine to cell phone location information.
Carpenter is a landmark Fourth Amendment decision—it establishes a
foundation for Fourth Amendment privacy in shared digital information. It
limits the third-party doctrine and refines the concept of voluntary
disclosure. At a minimum, when an information-collecting technology is
inescapable, revealing, and comprehensive, the Court will no longer hold that
using it eliminates a person’s Fourth Amendment rights. Yet the Court’s use
of inescapability in its Fourth Amendment analysis threatens to undermine
meaningful privacy protections for many forms of digital data. As an
inescapability standard gains support among scholars and lower courts, its
weaknesses have gone mostly overlooked.
C. Theories of Inescapability
The Carpenter decision represents a momentous change in Fourth
Amendment law. But the precise contours of that change remain unclear.
The Court’s opinion is notably ambiguous, 63 and it does not directly apply
its rationale to any form of information other than historical cell site data. 64
As with many major decisions, Carpenter’s meaning will ultimately emerge
from lower court interpretations, scholars’ analyses, and the Court’s future
cases. 65
See id. at 2211–12, 2220.
See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 16, at 451−53; Dalton, supra note 14, at 23; Laura K.
Donohue, Functional Equivalence and Residual Rights Post-Carpenter: Framing a Test
Consistent with Precedent and Original Meaning, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 347, 372; Lior
Strahilevitz & Matthew Tokson, Ten Thoughts on Today’s Blockbuster Fourth Amendment
Decision—Carpenter v. United States, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 22, 2018),
https://web.archive.org/web/20180721111755/https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2
018/06/ten-thoughts-on-todays-blockbuster-fourth-amendment-decision-carpenter-vunited-states.html [https://perma.cc/U8UH-VHVG?type=image].
64
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206, 2220.
65
See Caminker, supra note 16, at 460. The meaning of Katz v. United States, the
landmark decision that first applied the Fourth Amendment to intangible things like
telephone conversations, only emerged over time as subsequent cases interpreted and
applied Katz. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see, e.g., Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (clarifying that a Fourth Amendment search occurs when a
62
63
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In general, inescapability doctrine can be theorized as based in concepts
of fairness. It is less fair to eliminate a person’s privacy rights on the basis of
their disclosure of information when that disclosure could not have
reasonably been avoided.66 In addition, when disclosure is inescapable, a
person cannot be said to have assumed the risk of the government obtaining
the disclosed information. 67 Nor has the person made a fully voluntary
choice to reduce their privacy. 68
Many scholars place inescapability at the core of Fourth Amendment
law going forward, although their specific approaches vary. 69 Some have
interpreted Carpenter as establishing a multi-factor test in which
inescapability is an important factor. 70 For example, Paul Ohm posits that
Carpenter creates a broadly applicable test that examines 1) how revealing the
information is; 2) its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and

government act violates an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy”); United States
v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 1970) (considering whether defendant
had a “reasonable ‘expectation of privacy’” when crossing the border from Mexico to
California (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968))); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9
(1968) (“We have recently held that . . . wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable
‘expectation of privacy,’ he is entitled to be free from unreasonable government intrusion.”
(quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring))); see also, e.g., Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 (1974)
(providing early analysis of the Katz test and noting the largely objective and normative
nature of the test); William C. Heffernan, Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 37 (2001) (describing how the Court looks to social norms and
practices to identify reasonable expectations of privacy).
66
See Laura Moy, The Underappreciated Role of Avoidability in U.S. Privacy Law
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
67
Cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (stating that the voluntary disclosure
of information was an assumption of risk of further disclosure).
68
See Ari Ezra Waldman, Durkheim's Internet: Social and Political Theory in Online Society,
7 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 345, 409–10 (2013) (describing the concept of constructive
involuntariness in the context of internet use).
69
See infra notes 70–78 and accompanying text. Laura Donohue has criticized the Court’s
use of voluntariness concepts in Carpenter as part of her proposal for a property-based
Fourth Amendment along the lines of Justice Gorsuch’s Carpenter dissent. See Donohue,
supra note 63, at 381–82. She argues that information created and stored by others due to
a consumer’s actions, such as cell phone location data, should be considered the consumer’s
property for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 388–99.
70
See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 14, at 22; Ohm, supra note 8, at 369.
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3) whether exposure of the information is inescapable. 71 Information is
revealing when it is intimate or otherwise sensitive and its disclosure is likely
to harm the individuals involved. 72 Depth, breadth, and comprehensive
reach generally refer to the precision of the information, the duration of
observation, and the number of people observed. With regard to
inescapability, Ohm explains that “[s]ome forms of data collection are
inescapable because they relate to services one needs to use to be a functioning
member of today’s society.” 73 He also describes the intertwined concept of
automatic information collection, which occurs when data is inevitably
generated by a product or service and consumers have no opportunity to opt
out. Ohm sees inescapability as a key factor to be weighed in each case rather
than an ironclad requirement for Fourth Amendment protection. 74
By contrast, Orin Kerr views inescapability as an absolute prerequisite
for Fourth Amendment protection in data held by third parties. 75 He
contends that Carpenter limited the third-party doctrine largely on the
ground that people have no choice but to disclose their location information
to cell phone providers. 76 Going forward, courts must determine whether
individuals have a meaningful choice to refrain from certain activities or
information disclosures. Information that is inevitably shared is safeguarded.
But when consumers venture “beyond what the technology requires” for
participation in modern life, their data is not protected.77 Other scholars
have noted the ambiguity of the Carpenter standard while emphasizing the
central importance of inescapability to whichever standard ultimately

Ohm, supra note 8, at 369−70. Ohm views this test as applicable in virtually all
surveillance cases, not just those involving data held by third parties. Id. at 392−93.
72
Id. at 371–73.73 Id. at 376–77 (emphasis omitted).
73
Id. at 376–77 (emphasis omitted).
74
See id. at 380, 382–83 (weighing inescapability as an important but not essential factor
in a multi-factor test).
75
Kerr, supra note 15, at 20 (“This requirement . . . comes from Carpenter itself.”); id. at
21 (“Carpenter has a compulsion requirement.”); see Caminker, supra note 16, at 451
(noting the possibility of an inescapability requirement).
76
Kerr, supra note 15, at 20−21.
77
Id. at 22.
71
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emerges. 78
Currently, the dominant conceptual frameworks for
post-Carpenter Fourth Amendment law rely heavily on inescapability to
determine privacy rights.
D. Inescapability in the Lower Courts
Many lower courts consider inescapability a core determinant of Fourth
Amendment protection after Carpenter. These courts generally use
inescapability as an important factor in applying Carpenter, and some regard
it as essential to Fourth Amendment protection. However, lower courts’
applications of Carpenter are hardly uniform or settled.79 While the precise
contours of post-Carpenter doctrine remain in flux, the inescapability of
information disclosure is likely to play a major role in Fourth Amendment
law going forward.
Numerous cases applying Carpenter have found that individuals lack a
Fourth Amendment right in information disclosed as part of an optional or
escapable activity. For example, in United States v. Hood, the First Circuit
held that the government could warrantlessly collect a user’s IP address data
associated with a messaging app.80 The court reasoned that the app was
purely optional and thus people easily “could escape” any surveillance
associated with the app. 81 In United States v. Kidd, a federal district court
likewise held that the government could warrantlessly obtain IP address data
associated with a cell phone service, even though this data might reveal a
user’s location for a period of 581 days. 82 The court concluded that the
See Caminker, supra note 16, at 451 (positing that the Court may impose inescapability
as a requirement while acknowledging the possibility that it may be only a factor).
79
Some courts have largely ignored inescapability and focused on the other factors
identified in Carpenter, especially the revealing and extensive nature of the data sought. See
infra note 93.
80
United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019).
81
Id. (quoting United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018)). The court
likewise noted that the app only generated IP address information when the user made “the
affirmative decision to access [the] website or application.” Id.
82
See United States v. Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d 357, 358–59, 365–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)
(discussing the potential for cell phone IP address information to reveal location, although
noting that it is generally less revealing than CSLI data).
78
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service, which provided voice-over-internet-protocol (VOIP) phone calls,
was not “ubiquitous” or inescapable and it therefore received less Fourth
Amendment protection. 83 In United States v. Sigouin, a magistrate judge
found that requesting files via a peer-to-peer service was not “indispensable
to participation in modern society” like cell phone use, but was entirely
voluntary and avoidable.84 Accordingly, the government could record an
internet user’s peer-to-peer requests without a warrant.85 In United States v.
Cox, the judge ruled that the FBI could obtain Facebook activity records
because the defendant had not established that Facebook was ubiquitous or
“as indispensable as the cell phone” and because record generation “require[s]
affirmative action by the user.” 86 In United States v. Morel and several other
cases, circuit and district courts have held that subscriber information was
unprotected because, unlike cell phone location data, an individual
affirmatively chooses to provide it to an internet service. 87 State courts have
Id. at 365–67. The court noted that the data collection might violate the Fourth
Amendment if the defendant could demonstrate that the data collection was automatic and
thus inescapable or that the location data collected was detailed and extensive. Id. at 367–
68.
84
United States v. Sigouin, No. 19-80136-CR, 2019 WL 7373045, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Dec.
19, 2019) (quoting Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220), report and recommendation adopted, No.
9:19-CR-80136, 2019 WL 7372958 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 31, 2019).
85
Id. at *7; see also United States v. Shipton, No. 0:18-CR-202-PJS-KMM, 2019 WL
5330928, at *14 (D. Minn. Sept. 11, 2019) (concluding that “[t]he P2P software user
makes an intentional choice to connect to a network and has deliberately selected the files
she is willing to share in a designated folder” and therefore “[t]he peer-to-peer file sharer
plainly assumes the risk that anyone using the software could see the files she is sharing
while a cell phone user has not engaged in any sort of comparable voluntary act”), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 18-CR-0202 (PJS/KMM), 2019 WL 5305573 (D.
Minn. Oct. 21, 2019).
86
United States v. Cox, No. 1:18-CR-83-HAB, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97326, at *6, *10
(N.D. Ind. June 3, 2020).
87
Id.; United States v. Morel, 922 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2019) (“[A]n internet user generates
the IP address data . . . only by making the affirmative decision to access a website or
application.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st
Cir. 2019)); United States v. Maclin, 393 F. Supp. 3d 701, 708 (N.D. Ohio 2019)
(“Subscriber information requires an individual’s active participation – the subscriber only
captures information when the platform is used.”); United States v. Tolbert, No. 14-3761
JCH, 2019 WL 2006464, at *3 (D.N.M. May 7, 2019) (“[T]he subpoenaed data appears
to have been generated from Tolbert’s own affirmative actions in utilizing CenturyLink
83
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likewise held that information that a defendant could have withheld but
nonetheless disclosed when he entered into a transaction was not protected
by the Fourth Amendment. 88
Other cases have upheld Fourth Amendment rights because the
surveillance at issue was automatic or otherwise inescapable. In Naperville
Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, the Seventh Circuit held that a
city’s collection of data from its citizens’ smart utility meters was a Fourth
Amendment search.89 Citizens had “no choice at all” but to install the
required meters and therefore did not voluntarily disclose their data. 90 In
United States v. Diggs, the federal district court held that GPS data generated
by a device installed before the sale of a vehicle was protected by the Fourth
Amendment because the data disclosure was involuntary and occurred
without the owner’s knowledge. 91 In State v. Martinez, the government’s
testing of a patient’s blood sample violated the Fourth Amendment because
the patient did not voluntarily give his blood to be tested and could not have
avoided having his blood drawn. 92
To be sure, not all lower court cases applying Carpenter rely on
inescapability. Some cases instead focus on other factors, such as the
revealing and extensive nature of the data at issue. 93 The tension between
and AOL, and in this way is distinguishable from the CSLI data in Carpenter.”); United
States v. Therrien, No. 2:18-CR-00085, 2019 WL 1147479, at *2–3 (D. Vt. Mar. 13,
2019) (“In this case, law enforcement obtained information that an account holder
voluntarily turned over to Google.”).
88
State v. Leonard, 923 N.W.2d 52, 57–58 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019) (holding that appellant
lacked a Fourth Amendment right in the information he gave when securing a hotel room
because, unlike a cell phone user, he “chose . . . to provide identifying information to the
hotel as a means of securing a hotel room”).
89
Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 527 (7th Cir.
2018).
90
Id.
91
United States v. Diggs, 385 F. Supp. 3d 648, 660–61 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
92
State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278, 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (evaluating
voluntariness and explaining that the patient was incoherent when hospitalized and was
unable to consent to or refuse the blood draw).
93
United States v. Howard, No. 1:19-CR-54-WKW, 2019 WL 6048885, at *6 (M.D. Ala.
Nov. 15, 2019) (holding that one-day warrantless GPS tracking did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because it was shorter in duration and less revealing than cell phone tracking);
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these cases and the cases that depend on inescapability highlights the
uncertain nature of Fourth Amendment law post-Carpenter. Nonetheless,
numerous courts and several prominent scholars have relied on
inescapability, and it appears likely to shape Fourth Amendment law for years
to come. The next Part casts a critical eye on this development and identifies
several reasons to doubt that inescapability can function effectively as a
determinant of Fourth Amendment protection.

II.

CHALLENGING THE PREMISES OF INESCAPABILITY

This Part questions the conventional account of inescapability in Fourth
Amendment law. It examines the theoretical, practical, and normative flaws
of inescapability as a Fourth Amendment standard. Inescapability is
conceptually ambiguous and difficult for courts to assess. It does a poor job
of protecting the most intimate forms of personal electronic data. Further,
the incentives that an inescapability standard creates would cause substantial
social harm, as consumers either forego beneficial technologies or lose privacy
rights in their personal information. Finally, it would create doctrinal
confusion because several longstanding Fourth Amendment precedents
conflict with the inescapability model. This Part analyzes these issues and
challenges the premise that inescapabilty is an effective paradigm for Fourth
Amendment protection.

United States v. Kelly, 385 F. Supp. 3d 721, 726–27 (E.D. Wis. 2019) (holding that the
government could warrantlessly capture video from the hallway of an apartment building
which was not the defendant’s residence because the camera collected little information
and the information captured was not sensitive); United States v. Jenkins, No.
1:18-CR-181-MLB-CMS, 2019 WL 2482171, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2019) (finding
that the basic subscriber information associated with a user’s internet accounts was less
revealing and involved far less data than cell phone tracking, and was therefore not a
Fourth Amendment search), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:18-CR-00181,
2019 WL 1568154 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 11, 2019); People v. Tafoya, 2019 COA 176, ¶¶ 42–
48 (ruling that video surveillance of the curtilage of a suspect’s home for a three-month
period violated the Fourth Amendment because such monitoring captured a great deal of
information over time and could reveal sensitive details about a person’s life). These
opinions do not overtly reject the concept of inescapability, but they do resolve novel
Fourth Amendment questions without addressing it.
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A. Conceptual and Practical Issues
The first set of issues surrounding inescapability involve the difficulty of
defining it as a concept or assessing it in real-world cases. Inescapability
cannot be taken literally because virtually all forms of information disclosure
are avoidable in theory. On the other hand, a more nuanced inquiry into
how escapable a technology is would create severe administrability problems
and doctrinal unpredictability. In addition, the society-wide nature of the
inescapability inquiry overlooks individual differences and ignores
disadvantaged and disabled individuals. This section explores these issues.
1.

Everything Is Escapable in Theory

An “inescapability” standard for Fourth Amendment protection is
conceptually problematic. It cannot mean what it says. Virtually every form
of digital surveillance is escapable with sufficient effort. Technologies
regularly arise that allow users to avoid surveillance as they use the internet
or communicate electronically with each other. 94 Even unavoidable
disclosures to third parties can be bargained around, at least in theory. 95
Take internet data, for example. Internet use is a central part of modern
life. Records of the websites that a user visits are often collected by the
user’s internet service provider (ISP) 97 or by affiliated groups of websites that
collect the URLs of each page a user sees within their group. 98 Because these
96

See infra notes 100–104 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 105–107 and accompanying text.
96
Kerr, supra note 15, at 47.
97
Peter Segrist, How the Rise of Big Data and Predictive Analytics Are Changing the
Attorney’s Duty of Competence, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 527, 542–43 (2015); Matthew
Tokson, The Next Wave of Fourth Amendment Challenges After Carpenter, 59 WASHBURN
L.J. 1, 13 (forthcoming 2020). For instance, ISPs often maintain logs of the IP addresses
of each website a user visits along with the volume of data transmitted to and from the
user. See Tokson, supra note 40, at 603. Some ISPs retain the URL of each individual
page visited by a user. Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1424–25, 1432–38.
98
See, e.g., Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 2008
UTAH L. REV. 1433, 1447–48. In addition, some third-party entities place “web beacons”
on affiliated websites that track in the user’s activity on a particular site. Segrist, supra note
94
95
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records are created whenever a user visits a website, revealing one’s internet
habits may seem inescapable. 99 But there are relatively low-cost steps that
users can take to prevent the disclosure of their internet data.
Users can set up a Virtual Private Network to hide their internet activity
from their ISP and remain largely anonymous as they surf the web.100 They
can use the well-known and free TorBrowser to hide their IP address and
encrypt their web traffic. 101 They can simply opt out of Google’s collection
of their search term history. 102 And they can send messages through free
services like TorMessenger, TorChat, SecureDrop, or other services that
allow users to conceal their communications metadata and IP addresses. 103
97. These various entities can use websurfing information to target advertisements to the
individual user or sell the information to third-party advertisers. Tokson, supra note 40, at
603.
99
See Kerr, supra note 15, at 47.
100
For example, users can download the Express VPN app at https://www.expressvpn.com
[https://perma.cc/SA5H-9X8X]. Note that websites may be able to compromise
VPN-based anonymity via “fingerprinting”—the practice of tracking visitors to websites
based on the unique characteristics of their computers such as screen resolution, internal
network address, and downloaded fonts. See Geoffrey A. Fowler, Think You’re Anonymous
Online? A Third of Popular Websites Are “Fingerprinting” You, WASH. POST (Oct. 31,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/31/think-youreanonymous-online-third-popular-websites-are-fingerprinting-you/?arc404=true
[https://perma.cc/B89L-F72X].
101
Andy Greenberg, The Grand Tor: How to Go Anonymous Online, WIRED (Dec. 9,
2017), https://www.wired.com/story/the-grand-tor/ [https://perma.cc/B89L-F72X]. Tor
browsers are also effective against “fingerprinting.” See Fowler, supra note 100.
102
Kristin Burnham, 5 Google Opt-Out Settings to Check, INFORMATIONWEEK (Jan. 11,
2014), https://www.informationweek.com/software/social/5-google-opt-out-settings-tocheck/d/d-id/1113405 [https://perma.cc/BPX9-BSWC ] (“Unless you consistently delete
it, Google tracks and logs all your web history, including your image, news, map, and
video searches. You can remove all or some of your search history, or opt out of Google
tracking you entirely.”). Users could also use the DuckDuckGo search engine, which by
default does not collect IP addresses or user information. DUCKDUCKGO,
https://duckduckgo.com/privacy [https://perma.cc/NH3V-L388] (last visited July 28,
2020).
103
See Greenberg, supra note 101; see also Dan Goodin, New Signal Privacy Feature
Removes Sender ID from Metadata, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 30, 2018, 1:00 AM),
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/10/new-signal-privacy-featureremoves-sender-id-from-metadata/ [https://perma.cc/6D9X-E3DX] (noting that Signal
will continue to map senders’ IP addresses but will offer a service placing most user
information inside the encrypted message rather than in the header).
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Few internet users actually avail themselves of these options, perhaps because
of concerns about cost, speed, or convenience, or because they are unaware
of them. 104 But the disclosure of internet data to private parties is largely
escapable, in theory.
To take this point even further, consider that users can in theory bargain
with any service provider for more privacy, no matter how unavoidable the
underlying technology may be. 105 In a Coasian world with no transaction
costs, customers could simply pay their service providers to immediately
delete any information collected about them. 106 Of course, this might be
difficult to negotiate in the real world. 107 But it points up a conceptual failure
See, e.g., Users, TOR METRICS, https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relaycountry.html?start=2019-11-07&end=2020-02-05&country=us&events=off
[https://perma.cc/2JPA-N38K] (last visited Feb. 5, 2020) (displaying an estimate of
roughly 800,000 American Tor users as of February 2020).
105
Even cell phone tracking itself might in theory be avoided through bargaining.
Typically, a user’s location information is deleted after several years of storage. See United
States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210 (2018); Cell Phone Location Tracking Request
Response—Cell Phone Company Data Retention Chart, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cellphone-location-tracking-request-response-cell-phone-company-data-retention-chart
[https://perma.cc/RT7D-5WLK] (last visited July 31, 2020). Hypothetically, nothing
prohibits a cell phone user from paying their service provider to immediately delete any
location information gathered from their cell phone. However, the cell phone companies
contacted for this article either stated that they would not be willing to negotiate the
deletion of user data (Sprint, Verizon) or declined to comment on the matter (AT&T,
T-Mobile, U.S. Cellular). Note that it may be possible to avoid location tracking by
purchasing a Blackphone or other VOIP-based phone and run it on Wi-Fi networks,
avoiding cell signal disclosure entirely. See Jill Scharr, Blackphone vs. FreedomPop’s Privacy
Phone: Security Showdown, TOM’S GUIDE (Mar. 8, 2014),
https://www.tomsguide.com/us/blackphone-vs-freedompop-privacy-phone,news18427.html [https://perma.cc/R2Z9-4YXF]. While phones might be traced via Wi-Fi
network, secure phones use a VPN to connect to the internet in order to preserve user
anonymity. Id.; Martin Beltov, Cell Phones Can Easily Be Traced via WiFi, BEST SECURITY
SEARCH, https://bestsecuritysearch.com/cell-phones-can-easily-traced-via-wifi
[https://perma.cc/9EWH-28A7] (last visited July 31, 2020).
106
The Coase theorem, developed by Nobel Prize winner Ronald Coase, posits that in a
world with no transaction costs, initial allocations of property rights would not matter
because parties would bargain efficiently to distribute property to the highest value user.
E.g., R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–2 (1960); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 783–84
(1990);.
107
See supra note 105.
104
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of the inescapability standard: everything is escapable, for a price.
This is not to say that every lower court judge will apply the
inescapability standard literally. Many will take a more nuanced approach. 108
But there is serious risk in establishing a standard that, taken literally, would
render the Fourth Amendment inapplicable to most forms of digital
information. Lower courts often apply Fourth Amendment standards
literally, even when doing so exposes sensitive information to government
surveillance.109 And judges applying a more lenient concept of inescapability
will nonetheless be influenced by arguments demonstrating how feasible it is
in many cases to avoid information disclosure. An inescapability standard
puts individuals asserting privacy rights at a rhetorical and practical
disadvantage.
2.

Administrability Problems in Practice

Courts applying an inescapability standard might engage in a more
subtle inquiry into precisely how escapable a given technology is. 110

See infra section II.A.2.
For example, lower courts attempted to ascertain whether cell phone users had a
reasonable expectation of privacy by trying to estimate their knowledge regarding how cell
phones operate and the information disclosures inherent in cell phone use. United States
v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[A]ny cellphone user who has seen her
phone’s signal strength fluctuate must know that, when she places or receives a call, her
phone ‘exposes’ its location to the nearest cell tower and thus to the company that operates
the tower.”); In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 612
(5th Cir. 2013) (“[U]sers know that they convey information about their location to their
service providers when they make a call . . . .”); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)–(d), 42 F. Supp. 3d 511, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(“[S]ubscribers are aware that use of their cell phones necessitates disclosure of the
information sought.”); United States v. Madison, No. 11-60285-CR, 2012 WL 3095357,
at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2012) (stating that it is “common knowledge that
communications companies regularly collect and maintain all types of non-content
information regarding cell-phone communications, including cell-site tower data, for cell
phones for which they provide service”). Subsequent empirical studies found that most
courts’ estimates of societal knowledge were erroneous. See Tokson, supra note 50, at 176–
79 (reporting survey results indicating that the vast majority of cell phone users were
unaware that their phones could be tracked using cell phone signals).
110
See Kerr, supra note 15, at 21.
108
109
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Surveillance could be deemed inescapable whenever avoiding it would be
sufficiently difficult or costly for the average consumer. 111 But this would be
an ambiguous and fact-heavy inquiry, with results that would change over
time as technologies and social practices change.112 Making it a part of
Fourth Amendment analysis would render adjudication more difficult and
less predictable while providing minimal offsetting benefit. 113
Consider the assessment of whether a technology is “indispensable to
participation in modern society” and thus unavoidable. 114 Professor Kerr,
interpreting Carpenter’s standard, envisions this as a “philosophical question”
involving three further inquiries: “First, what does modern society look like;
second, what does it mean to participate in that society; and third, what
technologies are needed to achieve that participation.” 115 These are difficult,
abstract questions bound up with complex technological and sociological
issues. Such questions may be especially difficult for courts to resolve
effectively.116
Indeed, many lower court rulings on inescapability
post-Carpenter reach questionable conclusions about whether individuals can
actually avoid the use of certain technologies or practices. 117
Cf. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (discussing the ubiquity
of cell phones and their indispensable nature in modern society).
112
As the petitioner’s brief in Carpenter noted, the cell phone has gone from a niche
technology to the primary means of technological communication in the United States.
See Brief for Petitioner at 39−42, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct 2206 (2018) (No.
16-402). Cell phones now dominate the field of voice communication devices. Id. at 40.
(“A majority of American homes now do not have a landline telephone, as residents rely
exclusively on cell phones.”). Moreover, cell phones enable several other types of electronic
communication that play a central role in modern life, including texts, emails, messaging,
social media, and more. Id.
113
See infra subpart II.C (discussing the normative undesirability of the inescapability
inquiry).
114
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
115
Kerr, supra note 15, at 21.
116
See Donohue, supra note 63, at 381−83.
117
For example, courts have suggested that bank cards, instant messaging apps, and
internet service providers are optional rather than essential parts of modern life. See United
States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding that the use of a messaging app
was optional and a user “could escape” it); United States v. Tolbert, No. CR 14-3761
JCH, 2019 WL 2006464, at *3 (D.N.M. May 7, 2019) (finding that, unlike cell phone
data, subscriber information was generated voluntarily by a suspect when he chose to use
111
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The inescapability standard would saddle judges with high decision
costs. Elevated decision costs may be justified in some contexts, such as when
a balancing test that captures essential normative considerations outperforms
a simpler standard. 118 But inescapability is not this type of test. Indeed, as
discussed below, it would create harmful incentives for consumers and do a
poor job of protecting sensitive personal information.119 Before Carpenter,
inescapability might have been useful as a way to rebut the now-outmoded
claim that any disclosure of data to a third party eliminates privacy rights in
that data. 120 After Carpenter, and as the law continues to adapt to changing
technological and social contexts, the numerous drawbacks of inescapability
as a standard outweigh any remaining benefits.
3.

Inescapability and Disadvantage

The inescapability inquiry appears to focus on the population as a whole,
asking whether consumers in general can escape a given technology or
surveillance practice. 121 This may help avoid further complicating an already
difficult inquiry. But it does so at the expense of accurately measuring
whether an individual can avoid disclosing their information.
an internet service provider); United States v. Frei, No. 3:17-CR-00032, 2019 WL
189826, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 14, 2019) (stating that the use of bank cards was
voluntary, unlike cell-phone use). The vague, abstract nature of the inescapability standard
may yield especially high error rates, and courts may be tempted in difficult cases simply to
defer to the government.
118
Matthew Tokson, Blank Slates, 59 B.C. L. REV. 591, 613–18 (2018).
119
See infra subparts II.B−C.
120
This strong-form third-party doctrine concept is reflected in the much-criticized cases
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) and United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 442–43 (1976). The Supreme Court has not applied this concept since 1979 and
repudiated it in Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
121
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211 (recounting, in the first substantive sentence of the
opinion, that there are more cell phones in use in the United States than there are people);
id. at 2218 (describing the common practices of cell phone owners, including carrying
their phones with them wherever they go); United States v. Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d 357,
367 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (analyzing the societal ubiquity of a VOIP calling service); Kerr,
supra note 15, at 21 (describing the inescapability inquiry as centered on modern society
and modern life); id. at 48–49 (arguing that ride-sharing apps are not indispensable to
modern life because people can generally choose alternative modes of travel).
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People will vary widely in their reliance on various technologies and their
ability to avoid surveillance. A privacy-threatening technology that most
people can easily escape may be inescapable for others. For example,
ride-sharing apps such as Uber create and store records of all the trips taken
by their users. For most people, the use of such apps is optional. 122 They can
simply walk, take a bus, or drive their own car. For proponents of an
inescapability standard, ride-sharing apps are the paradigm example of an
avoidable technology.
Yet for some individuals, ride-sharing apps may be as indispensable as
cell phones or internet access. For disabled persons not living near public
transportation, ride-sharing services may be the only viable means of
transportation. 123 For individuals who cannot afford a car, ride-shares may
be essential for getting to appointments, social functions, job interviews, and
the like. 124 Studies have shown that majority-black neighborhoods often rely
heavily on ride-sharing services, in part because those services may offer
greater geographical coverage and less racial discrimination than traditional
taxi services. 125 In many areas, non-ride-share taxis are unavailable or are
Kerr, supra note 15, at 48–49.
See Rural Transportation Topic Guide Series Introduction, NAT’L AGING AND DISABILITY
TRANSP. CTR. 1–2 (2012), https://www.nadtc.org/wp-content/uploads/NADTC-RuralTransportation-Topic-Guides-Introduction-PDF-version.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGV4KSQW] (noting that eleven million rural residents are disabled, two-thirds of rural
residents are “older adults,” and “approximately 38 percent of rural residents live in areas
with no public transportation”). Modern public transportation systems often take
payments based on reusable cards purchased by credit card. Such payment systems make it
possible to track the travel records of users. See Diana Budds, A New Report Outlines
Privacy Risks for the MTA’s Contactless Payment System, CURBED N.Y. (Oct. 3, 2019),
https://ny.curbed.com/2019/10/3/20895736/mta-omny-privacy-surveillance-report
[https://perma.cc/PW5Z-368Z].
124
Carol Atkinson-Palombo, Lorenzo Varone & Norman W. Garrick, Understanding the
Surprising and Oversized Use of Ridesourcing Services in Poor Neighborhoods in New York
City, 2673 TRANSP. RES. REC.: J. TRANSP. RES. REC. 185, 189–90 (2019); Laura Bliss, Lyft
Is Reaching L.A. Neighborhoods Where Taxis Wouldn’t, CITYLAB (June 29, 2018),
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/06/lyft-is-reaching-la-neighborhoods-wheretaxis-wouldnt/563810 [https://perma.cc/NTE5-VVLB].
125
Bliss, supra note 124. Racial discrimination against black riders still persists on
ride-sharing services, although comparisons suggest that it is less than that experienced by
riders of traditional taxi services. Id.
122
123
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themselves tracked by GPS systems. 126
A similar point can be made about smart home devices, which often
collect detailed records concerning activities inside the home. 127
Internet-connected devices that can unlock doors, raise windows, turn on
lights, or operate appliances via voice command are a luxury for most
consumers. But for disabled users, they can be essential for empowerment
and independence. 128 Such devices have become a crucial part of many
people’s lives and relationships, dramatically expanding their economic,
personal, and social possibilities. 129 As Todd Stabelfeldt, a quadriplegic man
with no movement below his shoulders, put it, smart home devices have given
him “a lot of opportunities to demonstrate that I’m a quality man and I’m a
man of integrity . . . [y]ou can be who you want to be. This technology just
allows you to be you in your story.” 130
Indeed, any technology may be indispensable to certain people even if it
is unnecessary to most others. Dependence on various technologies will vary
based on people’s social, economic, and geographical contexts. For a
twenty-two--year-old in Atlanta, a certain app may be essential to
participating in the social life of her area, while a similar person in Houston
may have no need to use the app at all. 131 Likewise, business managers may
See, e.g., Dareh Gregorian, Appeals Court Rules City Can Monitor Taxis’ Movements with
GPS, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.nydailynews.com/newyork/appeals-court-rules-city-monitor-taxis-movements-gps-article-1.2767032
[https://perma.cc/JY9T-873Q] (describing New York’s system for monitoring its taxis via
GPS trackers and noting that it has operated since 2004).
127
Tokson, supra note 11, at 52–55.
128
Chiara A. Sottile, How a Smart Home Empowers People with Disabilities, NBCNEWS
(May 9, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/how-smart-home-empowerspeople-disabilities-n756731 [https://perma.cc/Y9T5-EE7Z] (“For some people, doing
something like turning on your lights or opening a blind or changing your thermostat
might be seen as a convenience, but for others, that represents empowerment, and
independence, and dignity.”).
129
Id.130 Id. (describing how smart home devices have enhanced Stabelfeldt’s life and
marriage, allowing him to operate independently and facilitating his job as an IT
consultant).
130
Id. (describing how smart home devices have enhanced Stabelfeldt’s life and marriage,
allowing him to operate independently and facilitating his job as an IT consultant).
131
See Donohue, supra note 63, at 382–83.
126
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find that a networking service is a professional necessity, while accountants
find it useless. The potential for variance among differently situated people
is enormous.
Existing concepts of inescapability do not appear to take personal
differences into account, a potentially serious flaw in their theoretical
framework. 132 Yet individualizing Fourth Amendment law is unlikely to be
a viable solution either. A Fourth Amendment standard that varies among
individuals based on their unique circumstances and the technological and
social practices of their localities would create doctrinal inconsistency, a flood
of litigation, and massive administrability problems for courts. 133 However
as it is applied, inescapability would create substantial difficulties for courts
and litigants.
B. Harmful Incentives and Deadweight Loss
One of the most serious drawbacks of inescapability is the incentives it
creates for consumers. When a technology is escapable, consumers are
incentivized to avoid it in order to preserve their privacy rights. But these
technologies, while perhaps not essential to modern life, tend to be beneficial.
Incentivizing people to avoid modern technology in order to prevent
government monitoring creates “deadweight loss”—it causes people to
reduce their use of beneficial technologies. 134 The Fourth Amendment
regime that Carpenter seems to endorse is a profoundly inefficient one.
There are numerous technologies that are arguably optional but
nonetheless greatly enhance users’ lives. Google Maps, Waze, and other
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
In other contexts, the Court has taken pains to avoid “mak[ing] a crazy quilt of the
Fourth Amendment” by allowing it to vary across different localities or based on the
differing practices of telephone service providers. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745
(1979).
134
A deadweight loss is a permanent loss to society that occurs when the equilibrium for a
good or service is not Pareto optimal, i.e., when there are other potential allocations under
which one actor in the system would be better off, and no one would be worse off. See,
e.g., R. PRESTON MCAFEE, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 112–113, 182–83,
198 (2006) (“The deadweight loss is important because it represents a loss to society much
the same as if resources were simply thrown away or lost.”).
132
133
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navigation apps are an important part of modern life, 135 but are probably not
inescapable in any meaningful sense. 136 Alternative navigation methods like
paper maps or asking directions are viable and widely available. Navigation
service providers generally collect and store data on users’ locations, creating
a detailed history of their movements and activities. 137 Government requests
for such data have sharply increased in recent years. 138 If users want to ensure
that this sensitive information is not available to the government without a
warrant, they would have to forego the use of navigation apps and use more
privacy-protective alternatives. But navigation apps greatly improve users’
ability to navigate, avoid traffic, and prevent getting lost. Giving consumers
incentives to stop using these apps would result in substantial societal harm,
even if only a small percentage of navigation app users changed their
RJ Reinhart, Most Americans Already Using Artificial Intelligence Products, GALLUP
NEWS: ECONOMY (Mar. 6, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/228497/americansalready-using-artificial-intelligence-products.aspx [https://perma.cc/5CYT-7TNR]
(roughly 84% of Americans use navigation apps).
136
It is difficult to say for certain, given the vagueness of the inescapability standard. See
supra subpart II.A.
137
See, e.g., Andrew Couts, Terms & Conditions: Waze Is a Privacy Accident Waiting to
Happen, DIGITAL TRENDS: MOBILE (Mar. 3, 2013),
https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/terms-conditions-waze-privacy-accident
[https://perma.cc/4ZL6-WJSA]; Delete Maps History on Your iPhone, iPad, or iPod Touch,
APPLE, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208651 [https://perma.cc/87D8-D64N] (last
visited July 31, 2020); Delete Navigation History, WAZE HELP,
https://support.google.com/waze/answer/6262570?hl=en&ref_topic=6262561[https://per
ma.cc/PVC6-KLPV] (last visited Jan. 27, 2020);; Jillian D’Onfro, Turning Off Location
History Doesn’t Stop Google from Storing Where You’ve Been—Here’s How to Limit the Info It
Logs, CNBC: TECH (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/13/how-to-stopgoogle-from-storing-your-location-history.html [https://perma.cc/8QXG-A8PW]; Manage
Your Location History, GOOGLE ACCOUNT HELP,
https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/3118687?hl=en [https://perma.cc/ESP6RPVS] (last visited July 31, 2020). However, effectively preventing the storage of one’s
location information by Google Apps is difficult, and the time and effort required to
manually delete one’s searches on the other apps is likely prohibitive. See D’Onfro, supra
note 137. Location search histories are also useful, creating an accessible database of
previously visited addresses and making navigation easier. Speed and ease of use is
particularly important for users navigating while driving.
138
Zack Whittaker, Uber Reports a Sharp Rise in Government Demands for User Data, TECH
CRUNCH (Nov. 20, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/11/20/ubertransparency-government-data [https://perma.cc/3MHF-MY63].
135
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behavior.139
Roughly 6% of Americans are currently using a dating app and 21%
have done so in the past. 140 These apps are popular but would probably not
be considered inescapable, even for single people.141 The majority of couples
still meet through other means, generally through friends, in bars or
restaurants, through coworkers, in school, or through family. 142 Dating apps
gather a vast quantity of user information, some of it quite intimate. 143 For
example, Tinder collects information on all of one’s matches, including their
age and race; the location and timing of every online conversation between
matches; which words one uses the most; how much time users spend looking
at others’ pictures before swiping; data from Facebook on users’ “likes” and
friend networks; and more. 144
In order to protect this information from government exposure,
individuals would have to choose one of the alternative, offline methods for
meeting potential dates. But many individuals would incur substantial costs
See Reinhart, supra note 135 (roughly 84% of Americans use navigation apps).
J. Clement, Percentage of Online Users in the United States Who Have Used a Dating
Website or App as of January 2019, STATISTA (April 29, 2020),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/310256/us-online-dating-app-site-usage/
[https://perma.cc/3MHF-MY63]. I use “app” to refer to both smartphone applications
and web-based applications on websites.
141
Again, it is difficult to say for certain given the conceptual confusion of the
inescapability principle. See supra subpart II.A. It could be argued that dating apps are
essentially inescapable for young, single people without extensive friend groups or social
networks, who have recently relocated to a new city, or who are recently divorced. Again,
an accurate assessment of escapability would require a granular, fact-based inquiry that
would vary from person to person. See supra section II.A.3.
142
See Michael J. Rosenfeld et al., Disintermediating Your Friends: How Online Dating in
the United States Displaces Other Ways of Meeting, 116 PNAS 17753, 17755 (2019).
143
Thomas Germain, How Private Is Your Online Dating Data?, CONSUMER REPS. (Sept.
21, 2019), https://www.consumerreports.org/privacy/how-private-is-your-online-datingdata [https://perma.cc/X926-B8UV] (reporting that dating apps may collect data on one’s
location, contacts, photos, network connections, time spent on profiles, and type of person
preferred by a user). Some dating apps generate revenue by using personal data to target
ads or by selling it to third parties. Id.
144
Judith Duportail, I Asked Tinder for My Data. It Sent Me 800 Pages of My Deepest,
Darkest Secrets, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 26, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/26/tinder-personal-data-dating-appmessages-hacked-sold [https://perma.cc/MRS3-QLDE].
139
140
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in doing so. Their dating prospects may be significantly reduced, especially
for LGBT+ persons or other individuals whose offline dating pool may be
limited. 145 The time and effort they spend seeking a dating partner might
increase substantially. Some may fail to meet their “soulmate”—millions of
marriages have had their start with online dating. 146 Even if the effects of
foregoing dating apps are not typically so severe, a legal regime that
discourages a popular and effective way for people to meet risks substantial
societal loss. 147
A similar analysis could be done for those users who can avoid using
ride-sharing apps and smart home devices. 148 These technologies are not
mandatory for many people, but they can nonetheless substantially enhance
people’s lives. 149 Ride-sharing apps may even save lives—most studies find
that their use is correlated with a significant reduction in drunk driving

See Anna Brown, Couples Who Meet Online Are More Diverse than Those Who Meet in
Other Ways, Largely Because They Are Younger, PEW RES. CTR. (June 24, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/24/couples-who-meet-online-are-morediverse-than-those-who-meet-in-other-ways-largely-because-theyre-younger
[https://perma.cc/SDL2-7722].
146
Cf. Erin Duffin, Number of Marriages in the United States from 1990 to 2018, STATISTA
(Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/195931/number-of-marriages-in-theunited-states-since-1990 [https://perma.cc/V5KW-LL4A] (showing that over two million
marriages occur per year in the United States); Rosenfeld et al., supra note 142, at 1 n.1,
fig.1 (The rate of marriage for couples who meet online is very similar to that of couples
meeting offline, and 40% of couples now meet online);.
147
For a discussion of dating app information collection and the potential for deterrence,
see Danielle Citron, The Data Death Penalty and Other Reforms for Protecting Intimate
Information, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
148
See supra section II.A.3.
149
Ride-sharing apps can make transportation far easier for travelers or persons who do not
own a car, reduce traffic, and may have unique social benefits for riders and drivers. See
Javier Alonso-Mora et al., On-demand High-capacity Ride-sharing via Dynamic Trip Vehicle
Assignment, 114 PNAS 462, 467 (2017); Why Ridesharing Reaps Unexpected Benefits,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Nov. 14, 2019),
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/ridesharing-culture-benefits
[https://perma.cc/L6LS-QZC2]. Smart homes have several benefits for consumers,
including energy efficiency, convenience, improving security, entertainment, detecting
faulty appliances, increasing property value, and improving health and quality of life. See
Charlie Wilson et al., Benefits and Risks of Smart Home Technologies, 103 ENERGY POL’Y
72, 76–77 (2017).
145
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fatalities. 150 Courts should be reluctant to establish a legal regime that
disincentivizes the use of potentially life-saving technologies among people
concerned with fundamental rights to privacy.
It might be objected that few people exist who are sufficiently concerned
with privacy from government observation to forego the useful technologies
described above. But this is hardly reassuring. Rather, it demonstrates that
the inescapability standard is behaviorally unrealistic and inconsistent with
meaningful Fourth Amendment protection in the digital age. It is not
reasonable to ask people to forego profoundly beneficial technologies in order
to preserve their rights. The likely upshot of such a standard is that many
consumers will continue to use these technologies and face comprehensive
government surveillance without constitutional safeguards.
C. The Normative Implications of Inescapability
A central goal of the reasonable expectation of privacy test is to protect
whatever society considers private. 151 Thus the Court has typically
safeguarded intimate places and information while declining to protect less
sensitive things.152 Yet inescapability does an especially poor job of protecting
sensitive data. An inescapability standard would often expose private data to
government scrutiny while shielding data that is relatively non-sensitive. 153
Optional technologies frequently capture the most intimate forms of
Jacey Fortin, Does Uber Really Prevent Drunken Driving? It Depends on the Study, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/business/uber-drunkdriving-prevention.html [https://perma.cc/Z6C4-8JRZ] (noting that studies
predominantly show a correlation between Uber services and lower rates of alcohol-related
accidents).
151
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”); id. at 351−52 (holding that telephone conversations are protected by the
Fourth Amendment in light of the “vital role that the public telephone has come to play in
private communication”).
152
Tokson, supra note 11, at 13–16.
153
For a detailed discussion of the concept of sensitive data, see Paul Ohm, Sensitive
Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1128–1132 (2015).
150
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data. Smart speakers record sounds inside the home and transmit those
recordings to third party service providers. 154 Internet-connected beds,
appliances, and personal items can record and transmit extremely intimate
details about people’s lives. 155 Health apps and “femtech” services collect
extensive, personal data about users’ bodies, prescriptions, habits, and
preferences. 156 Smart door locks such as Amazon Ring record all comings
and goings to a home and videotape all of a resident’s activities on their porch
or front yard. 157 DNA analysis services can obtain detailed information about
an individual’s genetic makeup, paternity, future health prospects, and
more.158 These technologies are escapable for most consumers, yet exposing
the sensitive data they collect to government observation subverts
fundamental Fourth Amendment values. 159
Raphael Davidian, Alexa and Third Parties’ Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 54 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. ONLINE 58, 59–60 (2017) (describing how smart speakers record and
process requests and other speech from their users); Austin Carr et al., Silicon Valley Is
Listening to Your Most Intimate Moments, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 11, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-12-11/silicon-valley-got-millions-to-letsiri-and-alexa-listen-in [https://perma.cc/K93B-Y5WJ] (discussing the “recordings of
intimate moments inside people’s homes” and other personal data captured by Amazon’s
Alexa and listened to by its employees).
155
See, e.g., Tim Bajarin, The Next Big Thing for Tech: The Internet of Everything, TIME
(Jan. 13, 2014), http://time.com/539/the-next-big-thing-for-tech-the-internet-ofeverything/ [https://perma.cc/8R96-PJH5]; Bree Fowler, Gifts that Snoop? The Internet of
Things Is Wrapped in Privacy Concerns, CONSUMER REPORTS (Dec. 13, 2017),
https://www.consumerreports.org/internet-of-things/gifts-that-snoop-internet-of-thingsprivacy-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/QD6H-5PCJ]; Melia Robinson, This Sex Wearable
that’s Being Falsely Marketed as a ‘Smart Condom’ Is Kind of Ridiculous, BUS. INSIDER (Mar.
3, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/smart-condom-icon-sex-wearable-2017-3
[https://perma.cc/VF4Q-VVET].
156
See Citron, supra note 147(manuscript at 5).
157
Rani Molla, How Amazon’s Ring Is Creating a Surveillance Network with Video Doorbells,
VOX (Jan. 28, 2020, 12:08 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/9/5/20849846/amazon-ringexplainer-video-doorbell [https://perma.cc/NV9J-XG9X].
158
Andelka M. Phillips, Only a Click Away—DTC Genetics for Ancestry, Health, Love …
and More: A View of the Business and Regulatory Landscape, 8 APPLIED & TRANSLATIONAL
GENOMICS 16, 16–20 (2016).
159
For a discussion of those values, see Tokson, supra note 118, at 635 & n.279 (discussing
historical sources on the broader purposes of the Fourth Amendment, including the
protection of privacy, property, and liberty). See also supra notes 127–129 and
accompanying text for a discussion of how smart home technologies may be essential to
154
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At the same time, many difficult-to-escape technologies may produce
less sensitive information or information that is especially useful in detecting
crime. Online banking or electronic wire transfers may be an inescapable
part of modern financial life, but the information they produce is rarely
intimate and is often essential to detecting white-collar crimes. 160 Utility bills
that record the electricity or water usage of a home are largely unavoidable
but typically reveal only very general and nonsensitive information. 161
Similarly, giving one’s subscriber information to online service providers is
likely inescapable because it is usually necessary for internet access. 162 Yet
subscriber information is not itself especially sensitive, mostly consisting of
data such as one’s name, address, and telephone number. 163 Inescapability
some disabled persons.
160
See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REV. 476, 509–10 (2011) (explaining that the Supreme Court eliminated the
warrant requirement for financial records following the rise of difficult-to-detect
white-collar crimes).
161
Smart meters and smart utilities may record more granular data about energy usage, but
traditional utility metering reveals only the overall energy consumption of a household. See
Deirdre K. Mulligan et al., Privacy in the Smart Grid: An Information Flow Analysis, CAL.
INST. ENERGY & ENV’T 1, 5–6 (2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1815605
[https://perma.cc/EQ5U-569T] (comparing the household information revealed by smart
meters versus traditional metering systems).
162
See, e.g., Comcast Customer Privacy Notice, COMCAST, https://cdn.comcast.com//media/Images/www_xfinity_com/Corporate/PrivacyPolicyUniLegalStndENG.pdf?rev=19
ecf433-a422-4978-ac4a-b7e17ffe8801&la=en [https://perma.cc/G53K-BYUM] (last
updated Jan. 1, 2018) (explaining that a customer’s name, address, email address, and
phone number are collected upon an account’s creation).
163
See Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2105, 2122 (2009). To be sure, this data can implicate privacy when it is
used to de-anonymize internet users. In any event, this data generally receives minimal
statutory protections compared to communications content, location information, and
other forms of digital data, and courts have virtually always declared it outside of the
Fourth Amendment’s scope, both before and after Carpenter. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2)
(2018); United States v. Morel, 922 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2019); United States v. Perrine,
518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000
WL 1062039, at *3 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000) (per curiam); United States v. Maclin, 393 F.
Supp. 3d 701, 708 (N.D. Ohio 2019); United States v. Tolbert, No. CR 14-3761 JCH,
2019 WL 2006464, at *3 (D.N.M. May 7, 2019); United States v. Sherr, 400 F. Supp. 2d
843, 848 (D. Md. 2005). See also Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712
(2018) (providing little protection for subscriber information, which can be obtained via
subpoena). This data is frequently obtained by the government in cases involving child
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would privilege these less sensitive forms of information over the intimate
data generated by more escapable technologies. 164 In many cases, an
inescapability standard would produce normatively undesirable outcomes
and fail to adequately protect privacy.
D. Inescapability and Precedent
Aside from its conceptual problems, the inescapability standard
threatens to make a mess of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It is directly
contradicted by several Supreme Court precedents still in force. 165 Indeed,
the Carpenter opinion reaffirms two of these precedents at the same time it
purportedly establishes the importance of inescapability. 166
In Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that people have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers that they dial. 167 In
United States v. Miller, it ruled that they have no privacy in their bank
records. 168 In neither case was the disclosure of information to a third party
any more escapable than the disclosures in Carpenter. 169 Telephones were
certainly a vital part of modern life by the time Smith was decided—the Court

pornography and online harassment. See, e.g., Sherr, 400 F. Supp. at 846; Freedman v.
Am. Online, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179–183 (D. Conn. 2005).
164
See supra text accompanying notes 154–158. Note that, under Professor Kerr’s
preferred application of Carpenter, subscriber information would not be protected despite
meeting the requirement of inescapability because it would fail under a separate
requirement that protected, third-party records be uniquely digital. See Kerr, supra note
15, at 16, 47.
165
See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding that people had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in their household trash placed in bags and left for
pickup, despite the potentially inescapable nature of trash disposal in areas where
individuals cannot lawfully bring their own trash to a landfill); Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not protect dialed
phone numbers); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to bank records).
166
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (“We do not disturb the
application of Smith and Miller . . . .”).
167
Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46.
168
Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43.
169
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
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itself had said so in a prior case. 170 And the use of a bank is a necessary part
of most people’s lives. 171 These cases have been widely criticized, 172 yet the
Court did not critique them or invoke stare decisis in upholding them. 173
There are a few possible explanations for the Court’s refusal to overturn
or criticize these cases. One is that the Court does not consider inescapability
an important factor, let alone a decisive one. 174 The Carpenter opinion
devotes substantially more discussion to the deeply revealing and extensive
nature of cell phone tracking than it does to inescapability. 175 It distinguishes
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (noting “the vital role that the public
telephone has come to play in private communication”).
171
Moreover, bank customers are unable to prevent banks from making and retaining
records of their financial transactions. The Bank Secrecy Act requires banks to, among
other things, make “a microfilm or other reproduction of each check, draft, or similar
instrument” presented for payment or deposit and retain these and other records for a
period of up to six years. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d)–(g) (2018). The Court expressly ruled in
Miller that this compulsory record keeping did not give rise to any Fourth Amendment
right for bank customers, who could not lawfully avoid scrutiny of their records. Miller,
425 U.S. at 441–42.
172
See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared
Privacy Rights in Stored Transactional Data, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 211, 242–44 (2006); Jed
Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 113–14 (2008); Daniel J. Solove,
Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083,
1136–38 (2002).
173
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. Neither did the Court question the rule of Stoner v.
California, where the Court held that hotel guests have a Fourth Amendment right in their
rooms despite giving permission to the cleaning staff to enter the room in the performance
of their duties. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964). Observation of a hotel
room by cleaning staff is easily avoidable in most situations; the guest need only place a
“Do Not Disturb” sign on the door to prevent it. Yet hotel rooms are universally
protected, no matter what steps the guest takes or fails to take to prevent observation by
third parties. Finsel v. Hartshorn, 200 F. Supp. 2d 960, 967 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (noting that
“[i]t is beyond question . . . that an unconsented police entry into a residential unit, be it a
house or an apartment or a hotel or motel room, constitutes a search within the meaning of
Katz v. United States” (alteration in original) (quoting 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE § 2.3(b) at 474–75 (3d ed. 1996)), aff'd sub nom. Finsel v. Cruppenink, 326 F.3d
903 (7th Cir. 2003); People v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 831, 848 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006) (drawing on Stoner to find a Fourth Amendment right against police inspections of
dorm rooms).
174
Cf. supra subpart I.C. (discussing interpretations of Carpenter that consider
inescapability either an important factor or a requirement for Fourth Amendment
protections).
175
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216–19. The Court’s relative lack of discussion of
170
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Smith and Miller by noting that those cases emphasized the nonrevealing
nature of the information obtained.176 It may be that the intimacy, extent,
and low cost of cell phone location tracking are what mattered to the Court,

inescapability is notable in light of the fact that Carpenter’s attorneys devoted several pages
to the topic. Brief for Petitioner at 39−44, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct 2206
(2018) (No. 16-402) . They argued that Carpenter had little choice but to use a cell phone
and to disclose its location to his service provider. Id. at 39−40. They pointed out that
nearly all American adults own a cell phone and that cell phones automatically transmit
location data to cell phone companies. Id. at 39−44. They note that alternative means of
vocal communication are disappearing, as a “majority of American homes now do not have
a landline telephone, as residents rely exclusively on cell phones.” Id. at 40. Payphones
have likewise shrunk to near irrelevance over the past two decades. See id. They note that
cell phones are often the exclusive means through which people contact first responders in
a medical emergency, report a crime, or to seek roadside assistance. Id. at 41. Roughly
seventy percent of 911 calls are placed from cell phones. Id. Cell phones generate and
transmit location data as long as they are switched on. Id. at 42. Location privacy settings
on a smartphone have no impact on the transmission of cell signals that permit
tower-based location tracking. Id. “There is no way to avoid the aggregation and retention
of this location information short of turning off or disabling the phone.” Id. Several
amicus briefs raised similar arguments about inescapability. See, e.g., Brief for Electronic
Frontier Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22, Carpenter v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402) (contending that “owning and
carrying a phone is hardly a choice at all” and “cell-phone users have no choice but to
reveal certain information to their cellular provider”); Brief for Scholars of the History and
Original Meaning of the Fourth Amendment as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12,
26, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402) (arguing that cell
phones are “essential tool[s] of modern life” and that people have no choice over whether
CSLI is collected); Brief for Michael Varco as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at
17, 20, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402) (arguing that
petitioner could have avoided having CSLI data collected by using internet-based apps or
leaving his cellular phone at home); Brief for National District Attorneys Association as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 17, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206
(2018) (No. 16-402) (arguing that petitioner could have restricted the conveyance of CSLI
by using apps to complete calls, putting his phone in airplane mode, or turning it off).
176
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20 (describing Smith and Miller); see Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (noting that “pen registers do not acquire the contents of
communications. . . . Neither the purport of any communication between the caller and
the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is
disclosed.” (emphasis omitted)); Miller, 425 U.S. at 440–42 (“On their face, the
documents subpoenaed here are not respondent’s ‘private papers[]’ . . . The checks are not
confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial
transactions.”)
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while inescapability did little or no work in resolving the case. 177
Another possibility is that the Court failed to recognize the conflict
between its precedents, creating a jurisprudence of confusion and
unpredictability. Lower courts looking for guidance on how to apply an
inescapability standard have only the brief discussion in Carpenter and several
contradictory precedents to consult. This doctrinal confusion adds to the
profound conceptual confusion surrounding inescapability, making it even
more difficult for lower courts to apply consistently. 178
Neither of these possibilities supports the use of an inescapability
standard going forward. Indeed, the conceptual, normative, and doctrinal
flaws of inescapability suggest that courts should look elsewhere for a Fourth
Amendment standard. The next Part explores ways that courts can minimize
the use of inescapability and examines alternative methods of applying the
Fourth Amendment to new technologies.

III. ESCAPING INESCAPABILITY
In light of the issues described above, this Part explores several alternative
approaches that avoid the use of inescapability. Lower courts can plausibly
focus on other factors and minimize inescapability when applying Carpenter,
as part of the interpretative process that inevitably follows a major new
Supreme Court decision. More broadly, scholars have proposed alternative
regimes that would transform Fourth Amendment law and replace the
current “reasonable expectation of privacy” framework. Most of these
approaches would offer more protection and clarity than an inescapability
standard. This Part discusses the advantages and disadvantages of these
alternatives and examines how they would address issues of third-party
disclosure and digital surveillance.

See Tokson, supra note 97, at 11–12 (describing the importance of intimacy, amount,
and cost in virtually all of the Court’s reasonable expectation of privacy cases, including
Carpenter).
178
See supra subparts II.A−B.
177
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It is worth noting that, under most of these approaches, concepts like
the widespread disclosure or publication of one’s information may still be
relevant to Fourth Amendment privacy. If a person posts their data to
Facebook or publishes it in a newspaper, that is likely to impact how
revealing, 179 or intimate,180 or protected by law181 that information will be.
When disclosure is limited to a single counterparty, however, its relevance is
likely to be limited. 182 Moreover, none of the alternative approaches turns
on whether a person had the ability to avoid the relevant transaction or
disclosure. 183 That assessment carries with it the substantial drawbacks and
decision costs described above.
A. Refining the Carpenter Framework
Supreme Court precedents, especially important ones, require
interpretation. 184 They do not resolve every possible issue or ambiguity but
leave it to future courts and other legal actors to fully articulate their
meaning. 185 In many cases, the Supreme Court expressly relies on lower court
interpretations of its prior decisions. 186 The Court also regularly consults
scholars’ interpretations and critiques of its prior cases. 187
See infra subpart III.A.
See infra subsection III.B.4(b).
181
See infra section III.B.2.
182
See infra subpart III.B. For a theoretical discussion of the relevance of the extent of
dissemination, see Lior Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 919, 973–975 (2005) (arguing that limited disclosures of information do not
eliminate privacy and detailing how social network analysis can aid courts in assessing the
extent of public disclosure in cases involving wider dissemination).
183
See infra subpart III.B.
184
Thus Supreme Court opinions interpret and apply past opinions while providing
material for future courts to interpret in an ongoing process of precedential interpretation.
185
Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921,
925–26 (2016).
186
See infra notes 204–206 and accompanying text.
187
See infra note 208. Legal scholarship appears to be especially influential in difficult
cases and those in which the Court alters precedent. Lee Petherbridge & David L.
Schwartz, An Empirical Assessment of the Supreme Court’s Use of Legal Scholarship, 106 NW.
U. L. REV. 995, 998−99 (2012) (noting that the Supreme Court is more likely to cite
scholarship in cases with indicia of difficulty and where decisions alter precedent).
179
180
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This “precedential dialogue” allows the Supreme Court to assess the
various interpretations of its rulings and observe their practical
consequences.188 It also presents an opportunity for courts and scholars to
influence the law’s development. 189 Broad Supreme Court opinions can be
viewed as a kind of delegation to lower courts, providing them with space for
interpretive flexibility. 190
The Carpenter opinion is notably cryptic regarding how courts should
address digital surveillance in the future. 191 It overtly declined to address any
form of information beyond historical cell phone location data. 192 The Court
instead chose to proceed incrementally so as not to “embarrass the future”
with a sweeping but erroneous decision. 193 Nonetheless, the impact of the
Court’s ruling that people can retain a Fourth Amendment right in
information owned by third parties is potentially massive. 194 The
considerations identified by the Court—the revealing, extensive, inescapable
nature of cell phone tracking—are broadly applicable to digital surveillance
generally.195 This is the archetypal example of a case that calls for further
development and interpretation.196
An important part of that development will be the minimization or
abandonment of inescapability in cases applying Carpenter. Inescapability
Re, supra note 185, at 927.
See infra notes 204–206, 208 and accompanying text.
190
Re, supra note 185, at 926.
191
Strahilevitz & Tokson, supra note 63.
192
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (“We do not express a view
on matters not before us: real-time CSLI or ‘tower dumps’ . . . . We do not disturb the
application of Smith and Miller or call into question conventional surveillance techniques
and tools, such as security cameras. Nor do we address other business records that might
incidentally reveal location information.”).
193
Id. (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944)).
194
Ohm, supra note 8, at 385.
195
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
196
Caminker, supra note 16, at 460 (stating that Carpenter’s “amorphous nature . . . now
gives judges license, if not permission, to deviate, to innovate, and even to anticipate
technological change”); Re, supra note 185, at 947 (“[T]he existence of ambiguity in a
higher court precedent can itself be regarded as a meaningful message to lower
courts . . . . disuniformity can sometimes be helpful in fostering ‘percolation’—that is,
experimentation and reflection on what might otherwise be stale legal rules.”).
188
189
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should be minimized for the reasons described above: it is difficult to
administer, conceptually confused, oblivious to disability and difference,
inefficient and socially harmful, and normatively undesirable. 197 Moreover,
minimizing inescapability reflects a plausible reading of Carpenter itself. As
noted above, the Court’s discussion of inescapability is relatively brief, while
the bulk of its opinion is concerned with the intimate, voluminous nature of
cell phone tracking. 198 The Court describes in detail the serious threats to
privacy that cell phone tracking poses. 199 Given this emphasis, it is unlikely
that the Court would permit the government to collect revealing or extensive
data at low cost regardless of how escapable it was. 200 Nor is inescapability
compatible with the Court’s other Fourth Amendment precedents.201
Lower courts applying Carpenter can plausibly assess surveillance based
on its revealing and extensive nature while ignoring inescapability or
mentioning it only in passing. 202 Indeed, some courts have already ignored
inescapability when applying Carpenter. 203 Moreover, lower courts have
successfully narrowed or modified constitutional doctrines in several similar
contexts. 204 For example, the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test is
See supra Part II.
See supra notes 175–177 and accompanying text.
199
See Tokson, supra note 97, at 10 n.78.
200
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–19 (describing at length the privacy harms that may
result from cell phone tracking); id. (noting the ubiquity of cell phone use); Tokson, supra
note 97, at 10 n.78, 13 (noting the ubiquity of cell phone use).
201
See supra subpart II.D.
202
See Re, supra note 185, at 942 (discussing the plausibility of a lower court’s narrowing
interpretation of a search incident to arrest precedent).
203
Compare United States v. Howard, No. 1:19-CR-54-WKW, 2019 WL 6048885, at *6
(M.D. Ala. Nov. 15, 2019) (assessing GPS tracking without addressing inescapability), and
People v. Tafoya, 2019 COA 176, ¶¶ 42–48 (holding that video surveillance of a suspect’s
curtilage was a Fourth Amendment search on the basis of factors other than inescapability),
with United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding that the government
could warrantlessly collect IP address data associated with a messaging app because the app
was optional and escapable), and State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278, 288 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2019) (holding that a blood draw of an accident victim was a search because the
patient could not have escaped it).
204
After Boumediene v. Bush held that prisoners held in Guantanamo Bay could file writs of
habeas corpus and secure “meaningful” review of their detentions, the D.C. Circuit
repeatedly construed detainees’ rights of review narrowly. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
197
198
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nominally a two-prong test, but its first prong, asking whether a person had
a subjective expectation of privacy, is largely ignored by lower courts.205 Most
courts do not mention it, and most that do mention it do not apply it. Courts
could similarly excise inescapability from any application of Carpenter to
digital information. 206
Lower courts 207 and scholars 208 should recognize the flaws of the
723, 779 (2008); Re, supra note 185, at 963−64; Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit
After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1451 (2011). Lower court decisions
interpreted Supreme Court precedents to require only a preponderance of the evidence
standard for detention, to permit the use of hearsay evidence, and to limit remedies for
unlawfully held detainees. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011); Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1104 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (suggesting that the burden for continued detention might be even less than a
preponderance of the evidence), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011); Vladeck, supra note
204, at 1476−88 (describing the relevant remedies cases). The Supreme Court has largely
accepted these modifications. See Vladeck, supra, at 1475; Lyle Denniston, Ex-judge:
Boumediene Is Being “Gutted”, SCOTUSBLOG (July 17, 2012, 3:54 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/ex-judge-boumediene-is-being-gutted
[https://perma.cc/3KCS-55HS].
In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court commanded lower courts to resolve qualified
immunity cases by first assessing whether a constitutional right was violated and only then
assessing qualified immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). Many lower
courts declined to enforce this rule, while others criticized the rule aggressively. Matthew
Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 955 (2015). Eight
years later, the Supreme Court reversed its prior decision, citing lower court confusion and
criticism. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234–35 (2009).
205
Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. 113, 114 (2015).
206
Alternatively, courts might minimize, narrow, and/or critique inescapability even if they
consider it binding law. For examples of courts minimizing or successfully critiquing
aspects of Supreme Court law, see supra note 204 and accompanying text.
207
See supra notes 202–206 and accompanying text.
208
Scholars likewise play a substantial role in interpreting and critiquing ambiguous
Supreme Court standards. In areas ranging from the Establishment Clause to contempt of
court, the Court has acknowledged and often ruled in accordance with academic criticism
of its prior decisions. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2081 (2019)
(noting that the Lemon test has been “questioned by a diverse roster of scholars” and
declining to apply the test to evaluate longstanding monuments using religious imagery);
Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827 n.3 (1994)
(“Numerous scholars have criticized as unworkable the traditional distinction between civil
and criminal contempt.”). It often rules in line with the scholarly consensus in these cases.
Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2081, 2089 (ruling in favor of a longstanding monument,
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inescapability standard. In light of these flaws, Carpenter is best read to create
a standard that focuses on the revealing and detailed nature of digital
surveillance. Surveillance that reveals “the privacies of life” and “provides an
all-encompassing record” of a user’s activities should be governed by the
Fourth Amendment, regardless of escapability. 209
B. Alternative Models of Fourth Amendment Protection
Although Carpenter forges a new path for Fourth Amendment law in the
digital era, it does so by refining the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test
that courts have used since the late 1960s. 210 That test has been criticized as
tautological, confusing, and underprotective, in addition to its difficulties
with data held by third parties. 211 In recent years, scholars have proposed
various alternative regimes for determining the Fourth Amendment’s scope.
These approaches have their own advantages and disadvantages, but each of
them would avoid using inescapability to determine Fourth Amendment
rights. This section explores these alternatives and assesses how each would
apply to government surveillance of digital information held by third parties.
1.

The Normative Approach

Rather than attempting to assess people’s expectations of privacy, courts

contrary to what the Lemon test might direct); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2206, 2262 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court’s limitation of the
third-party doctrine was bolstered by vigorous scholarly criticism of the doctrine); see
Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1052 n.10 (2017) (noting scholarly criticism of a Texas
standard and overruling that standard).
209
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
210
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (“We have recently held that . . . wherever an
individual may harbor a reasonable ‘expectation of privacy,’ he is entitled to be free from
unreasonable government intrusion.” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring))).
211
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); William Baude &
James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821,
1824–25 (2016); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth
Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 132–39 (2002);
Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1511 (2010).
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might take a more directly normative approach, asking what protections the
Fourth Amendment should provide to people regardless of societal
expectations. 212 For example, courts could apply a balancing test analogous
to those used throughout First Amendment law, weighing the benefits of a
type of government surveillance against its harms. 213 In prior work, I have
offered an account of the core normative considerations involved: the benefits
of crime detection and prevention, and the harms of deterring lawful
activities, impairing relationships, and inflicting direct psychological
injury. 214 The Supreme Court has itself engaged in normative balancing in
prior Fourth Amendment cases, albeit in a rudimentary manner. 215 Likewise,
some lower courts applying Carpenter have taken a normative approach,
focusing directly on the privacy harms and chilling effects of government
surveillance in novel Fourth Amendment contexts. 216
A normative balancing approach would have several advantages,
Aya Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz Is Made of?, 41 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 781, 795 (2008) (“At some level the constitutional inquiry must concern
not just what society actually believes is private, but what we ought to be able to regard as
private . . . .”); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141, 155–57
(2014) (proposing a normative regime based on whether surveilled behavior is of private or
public concern); Olivier Sylvain, Failing Expectations: Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the
Era of Total Surveillance, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 485, 522 (2014) (arguing that courts
should reject expectation-based tests and adopt a more normative approach); Matthew
Tokson, The Normative Fourth Amendment, 104 MINN. L. REV. 741, 743 (2019)
(proposing a normative balancing test for Fourth Amendment Searches).
213
Tokson, supra note 212.
214
Id. My proposed test would also consider whether the same law enforcement goals
could be achieved via a less invasive practice. Id. at 768; see also Susan Freiwald, First
Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (discussing factors that
make government observation especially worthy of regulation); Henderson, supra note 43,
at 985–1014 (listing considerations that lower courts have found relevant to privacy).
215
See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1984) (balancing a prisoner’s privacy
interests against the government’s interests in prison administration).
216
See United States v. Chavez, No. 3:18-CR-00311-MOC-DCK-3, 2019 WL 5849895,
at *6 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 7, 2019) (evaluating the vital role that social media plays as a
conduit for intimate or political speech and finding that the Fourth Amendment protects
nonpublic Facebook communications from government surveillance); United States v.
Moore-Bush, 381 F. Supp. 3d 139, 148–49 (D. Mass. 2019), as amended (June 4, 2019)
(discussing at length surveillance’s chilling effects on religious, intimate, and social
activities in evaluating pole camera surveillance of a suspect).
212
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including its adaptability to new surveillance technologies and social
contexts, consideration of discrimination-based harms, and ability to address
programmatic surveillance. 217 Its drawbacks include the relative difficulty of
administering a balancing test and the potential for unpredictability when
addressing novel issues. 218
In contrast to an inescapability standard, this approach would likely
protect most forms of personal digital information held by third parties. 219
When government observation of such information would cause serious
privacy harms—as with emails, smart home devices, websurfing data, IP
addresses, and more—a normative approach would generally require the
government to secure a warrant. 220 In areas where data is less sensitive and
especially important to crime detection, such as noncredit-card banking
information, the Fourth Amendment would likely not apply. 221
2.

The Positive Law Regime

Courts could rely on other sources of law to determine the Fourth
Amendment’s scope. Under a positive law approach, the Amendment would
apply whenever an official commits an act that would be unlawful or tortious
if done by a private citizen. 222 The Supreme Court has looked to positive law

Tokson, supra note 212, at 778–86.
Id. at 786–95. Note that the current reasonable expectation of privacy standard suffers
from the same flaws, and a normative replacement would likely be no harder to administer
or more unpredictable than the current test, which is famously confusing and
unpredictable in its application. See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth
Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST.
JOHNS L. REV. 1149, 1153–58, 1166 (1998); Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness After Carpenter, 128 YALE L.J.F. 943, 958–60 (2019); see also George M.
Dery III, Failing to Keep “Easy Cases Easy”: Florida v. Jardines Refuses to Reconcile
Inconsistencies in Fourth Amendment Privacy Law by Instead Focusing on Physical Trespass, 47
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451, 471–79 (2014) (discussing the flaws and inconsistencies of the
Court’s current property-based subtest).
219
Tokson, supra note 212, at 801–08.
220
See id.
221
Id. at 804–05.
222
See Baude & Stern, supra note 211, at 1831−32; Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer,
Decentralizing Fourth Amendment Search Doctrine, 107 KY. L.J. 169, 210–11 (2019).
217
218
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in a handful of prior Fourth Amendment cases. 223
Such an approach would be predictable where existing law is clear and
would benefit from legislators’ informational advantages and ability to
regulate comprehensively. 224 On the other hand, a positive law regime would
often base the Fourth Amendment on considerations that are irrelevant to
privacy, would remove limits to the political branches’ ability to compromise
citizens’ rights, and might underprotect privacy due to the high enactment
costs of legislation. 225
A positive law approach would likely protect digital information held by
third parties in many situations, though it is difficult to say for certain due to
the ambiguous application of positive law in this context. The leading
positive law proposal would apply the Fourth Amendment not only to
violations of law but also when an official uses the government’s unique legal
authority to obtain information.226 This would presumably prohibit grand
jury and administrative subpoenas, although civil subpoenas available to any
citizen would likely be allowed. 227 Informal government requests for data or
documents are more difficult to assess. 228 While requests from a government
The Court typically invokes positive law when finding no constitutional violation in
situations when police behavior was otherwise lawful or did not affect the defendant’s
property. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (plurality opinion) (noting that
the government flew a helicopter at a lawful height above a defendant’s house); Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 129 (1978) (finding that Petitioner could assert no property right or
possessory interest in the items searched). The Court does not appear to have ever found a
Fourth Amendment right on the basis that the police violated applicable positive law. Cf.
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding that people have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in their trash left on the curb and rejecting the idea that state law
could dictate the scope of the Fourth Amendment).
224
Baude & Stern, supra note 211, at 1851−53; Tokson, supra note 50, at 192−93. Many
Fourth Amendment cases will present issues that are unresolved in existing statutes or
precedents. See Tokson, supra note 212, at 795–96. Government surveillance practices
like drug-sniffing dogs or satellite-based observation do not arise in litigation between
private parties, and the privacy tort cases that do arise typically rest on an open-ended
reasonableness standard that is not well developed. Id. at 796.
225
Richard M. Re, The Positive Law Floor, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 313, 330−31 (2016);
Tokson, supra note 212, at 796–98.
226
Baude & Stern, supra note 211, at 1831−32.
227
See FED. R. CIV. P. 45.
228
Tokson, supra note 212, at 798 n.331.
223
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official would likely be far more influential than those from a private party,
it is unclear whether a positive law approach would take such nonlegal factors
into account. 229
3.

The Historical Approach

Courts could interpret the Fourth Amendment as Justice Thomas
proposed in his dissent in Carpenter, limiting it to certain types of tangible
property owned by an individual. 230 Under this approach, the Amendment
would apply only to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects.231 Intangible
things, other types of property, and records and data owned by other parties
would not be covered.232
This approach would be conceptually clear and would comport well with
historical Fourth Amendment practices.233 It would mean, however, that
nearly all information disclosed to a third party would be unprotected, along
with one’s conversations and nonresidential real property. 234 This approach
would be easier to administer than an inescapability standard but would offer

Re, supra note 225, at 324. Re criticizes Baude and Stern’s positive law model for
directing judges to imagine a police officer stripped of official authority, without
accounting for the social authority that officers also possess. Id. Baude and Stern posit
that the positive law model might be loosened to incorporate some effects of official
authority, but appear to limit this to “hidden legal privilege.” Baude & Stern, supra note
211, at 1865−66.
230
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238–39 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Jeffrey Bellin, Fourth Amendment Textualism, 118 MICH. L. REV. 233, 260–62
(2019).
231
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (establishing a right in “persons, houses, papers, and
effects”).
232
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2238 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
233
The idea that people can only assert their own property rights in Fourth Amendment is
often framed as textualist, but the text of the Fourth Amendment uses plural terms such as
“the people” and “their” persons, houses, papers, and effects. While historical practice is
consistent with a Fourth Amendment limited to trespasses on an individual claimant’s
property, the text itself is consistent with a broader, collective right. See generally David
Gray, Collective Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 77 (2018)
(arguing for a more expansive interpretation of Fourth Amendment privacy interests).
234
See Tokson, supra note 212, at 800.
229
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little protection for most forms of digital information. 235
Such a rule would expose a vast swath of personal data to government
observation, at least until legislatures acted to fill in the gaps.236 It would also
enact a substantial institutional shift, largely transferring responsibility for
privacy protection against government officials from courts to legislatures,
and from the Constitution to statutory law. The effects of such a transition
are difficult to predict but would likely result in diminished protection
against government surveillance. 237
4.

Alternative Interpretations of Existing Law
a)

Empirically Measuring Expectations

Instead of replacing the reasonable expectation of privacy test, courts
might reinterpret it to make its application more coherent and predictable.
The contents of emails and text messages probably would be protected under a historical
approach. See Bellin, supra note 230, at 279–80. Although service providers often have
access to such documents, they are generally stored on behalf of the user and are likely to
be considered “their . . . papers.” Id. at 280. However, the government could subpoena a
person’s emails from their recipients without violating the person’s Fourth Amendment
rights under this approach. See id.
Some theories grounded in text and history would go in another direction, requiring
a warrant for nearly every type of information recorded on paper. Laura Donohue has
proposed that courts could find that an individual has a property right and thus a Fourth
Amendment right in records that exist due to the individual’s actions. Donohue, supra
note 63, at 353. The idea of owning another person’s records on the basis that those
records reflect information about one’s life would allow for sweeping Fourth Amendment
protection but would likely require a substantial restructuring of current property
doctrines. Cf. id. at 400 (suggesting that granting individuals ownership in information
generated about them may not comport with current or historical bailment law).
236
Bellin, supra note 230, at 243.
237
Legislatures may struggle to do so quickly or effectively, given the various institutional
barriers to comprehensive privacy legislation. See, e.g., FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL.,
LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE 24–26, 45 (2009). They might also simply not be
interested in erecting new barriers to government surveillance. Historically, legislatures
have been largely ineffective in regulating government surveillance of electronic
information. See Tokson, supra note 50, at 193–94. Further, in the decades before the
Supreme Court held that wiretapping was unconstitutional, Congress was ineffective in
preventing widespread wiretapping and egregious government misuses of the recorded
conversations. See Tokson, supra note 212, at 798, 799 n.340.
235
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Several scholars have argued that surveys assessing people’s expectations of
privacy should play an important role in determining the scope of the Fourth
Amendment. 238 These scholars would interpret the reasonable expectation
of privacy standard more literally than the Supreme Court has to date.239
Under this interpretation, empirical evidence indicating that Americans
expect privacy in a given form of information against government
surveillance would weigh heavily in favor of Fourth Amendment
protection. 240
A survey-based approach to the Fourth Amendment’s scope would be
conceptually straightforward and, based on existing surveys, would produce
fairly clear answers. 241 There are now several high-quality surveys of privacy
expectations available.242 That said, an approach that turns on people’s literal
See, e.g., Bernard Chao et al., Why Courts Fail to Protect Privacy: Race, Age, Bias, and
Technology, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 276–77 (2018); Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic
Theory, 6 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 226−28 (2015); Christine S. Scott-Hayward et al., Does
Privacy Require Secrecy? Societal Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 19, 46 (2015). These scholars do not propose wholly substituting empirical evidence
for the existing reasonable expectation of privacy test, but rather that such evidence would
play a pivotal role in cases where the Court determines that probabilistic expectations
should determine the Fourth Amendment’s scope. E.g., Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra, at
222−23 (integrating survey evidence into existing theories of the reasonable expectation of
privacy test). Still, most of these scholars appear to contemplate a robust, even
determinative role for survey evidence in Fourth Amendment search law. See id. at 228
(contending that a public-opinion-focused Fourth Amendment test is normatively
desirable); Chao et al., supra, at 276 (arguing that “the most natural reading of the Katz
reasonable expectations of privacy test” is one that consults surveys of Americans);
Scott-Hayward et al., supra, at 46 (“[W]hat constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy
by societal standards poses an empirical question.” (emphasis omittd)).
239
See Tokson, supra note 11, at 49 (discussing Hudson v. Palmer and the Court’s overt
rejection of a literal reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry); cf. supra note 238 and
accompanying text (arguing for a literal, empirical definition of expectations of privacy).
240
Chao et al., supra note 238, at 276; Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 238, at 228.
241
See Chao et al., supra note 238, at 300−01 tbl.2 (reporting that overwhelming majorities
of respondents found a violation of reasonable expectations of privacy for scenarios
including GPS tracking, cloud document searches, drone surveillance, and email
metadata). Both Kugler and Strahilevitz, supra note 238, at 246, 260 tbl.9, and Chao et
al., supra note 238, at 298 fig.1, show that a majority of respondents considered location
tracking to violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.
242
See, e.g., Chao et al., supra note 238, at 298−302; Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 238,
238
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expectations of privacy is vulnerable to government manipulation and subject
to change over time. 243 In addition, surveys of expectations about novel or
largely unknown forms of surveillance may not produce meaningful results.
Evidence from existing surveys generally supports protecting electronic
data disclosed to third parties. Respondents have indicated that they expect
privacy in their cell phone location data, 244 emails,245 websurfing data, 246
cloud documents, 247 Google maps data, 248 and more. 249 However, particular
results may vary based on question phrasing and the details of the surveillance
scenarios that pollsters create. 250 Respondents were less likely to report
expectations of privacy when hypothetical surveillance conduct was directed
at another person rather than themselves. 251 And they were much less likely
to report expectations of privacy when the hypothetical surveillance yielded
useful evidence.252 Even with these caveats, existing survey evidence suggests
that people expect privacy in electronic data exposed to third parties in many
scenarios. 253
b)

Intimacy, Amount, and Cost

Finally, the Supreme Court could interpret the reasonable expectation
of privacy test to depend on three factors discussed in Carpenter and other
cases—the intimacy of the thing searched, the amount of information
at 246−60; Scott-Hayward et al., supra note 238, at 52−58; Christopher Slobogin,
Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 335 (2008);
Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized
and Permitted by Society”, 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 732 (1993).
243
Solove, supra note 211, at 1522–24.
244
Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 238, at 246.
245
Id. at 260 tbl.9.
246
Chao et al., supra note 238, at 298 fig.1.
247
Id.
248
Id.
249
Id.; Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 238, at 260.
250
E.g., Chao et al., supra note 238, at 298−299 (discussing biases observed in the study’s
survey results).
251
Id. at 298−299; Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 242, at 759–61.
252
Chao et al., supra note 238, at 298−299.
253
Id. at 298 fig.1.
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obtained, and the cost of the surveillance practice. 254 This doctrinal shift
finds support in the Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents, which are nearly
always decided in accord with the intimacy, amount, and cost of the
surveillance at issue. 255 The Court has overtly addressed these factors in many
cases and appears to implicitly rely on them in others. 256 By contrast, other
factors such as disclosure to third parties or inescapability have had little to
no influence on the outcomes of the Court’s cases. 257
The Court could expressly adopt this approach, holding that the
intimacy, amount, and cost of surveillance will dictate whether it violates a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 258 This framework is relatively easy to
Tokson, supra note 11 (manuscript at 2–3). In general, the more intimate the place or
thing targeted by surveillance, the more likely it is to violate reasonable expectations of
privacy. The greater the amount of information sought, the more likely it is to violate
reasonable expectations of privacy. Conversely, the more costly the investigation, the less
likely it is to violate reasonable expectations of privacy. Id.
255
Id.
256
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429−30 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in
the judgment) (discussing the large amount of data gathered and low cost of long-duration
GPS surveillance of a car); id. at 415−16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (discussing the
intimacy, amount, and cost associated with GPS surveillance of a car); Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (“In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate
details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.” (emphasis
omitted)); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 446 (1989) (“[T]here is no evidence . . . that
intimate details connected with the use of the home or curtilage were observed . . . .”);
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 302 (1987) (concluding that police could visually
inspect a barn because they “possessed objective data indicating that the barn was not being
used for intimate activities of the home”); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,
238 (1986) (holding that the surveillance of commercial property via airplane-mounted
camera was not a Fourth Amendment search because the “photographs here are not so
revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns”); Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (“[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate
activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or
surveillance. There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such
as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields.”); United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696, 707 (1983) (noting the limited amount of information disclosed by a drug dog sniff);
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983) (discussing the possibility of
“twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen”).
257
See Tokson, supra note 97.
258
It might apply this on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with its existing precedents.
Tokson, supra note 11, at 43. Or it may focus on the potential for new surveillance
technologies to gather large volumes of data at low cost, rather than analyzing the
254
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apply and fairly effective at capturing the harms of pervasive surveillance.259
As for drawbacks, this approach is largely intuitive and non-specific, and may
be vulnerable to changes in surveillance practices over time. 260
Its application to digital records held by third parties may vary
depending on the facts of the case, but in general it would offer strong
protection for digital information. Government requests for data stored in
third-party databases generally involve obtaining large amounts of personal
data at low cost. 261 In many contexts, such as smart homes and devices,
websurfing, search terms, television and streaming data, ride-sharing services,
dating apps, and more, an approach focused on intimacy, amount, and cost
would require the government to obtain a warrant before collecting people’s
information. 262
Inescapability is not inevitable as a Fourth Amendment standard. There
are several viable alternatives for applying the Fourth Amendment in the
digital age. While these alternatives have their own drawbacks, most of them
offer more protection for personal data, and a more coherent standard, than
inescapability.

CONCLUSION
This Article has analyzed the concept of inescapable surveillance and
challenged the prevailing wisdom that it should be a determinant of Fourth
Amendment protection. Inescapabilty is difficult to apply, inequitable in its
treatment of disadvantaged groups, ineffective in its protection of sensitive
data, and poorly designed to incentivize beneficial behavior by consumers.
circumstances of the particular case. David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to
Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 71–72 (2013). This approach would broadly
protect virtually all forms of digital information and would be relatively easy to apply,
though it risks restraining event-driven or minimal police investigations of non-intimate
data.
259
Tokson, supra note 11, at 43.
260
Id. at 43–44.
261
Gray & Citron, supra note 258, at 114.
262
See Tokson, supra note 11, at 47 (discussing several of these technologies and assessing
the likely intimacy, amount, and cost associated with associated surveillance practices).
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In light of inescapability’s conceptual, practical, and normative flaws, lower
courts should avoid its use in future Fourth Amendment cases. Courts
should focus instead on the revealing and extensive nature of the government
surveillance at issue. These were the factors that drove the result in Carpenter,
and they should set the path of Fourth Amendment law in the near term.
Going forward, the Supreme Court should consider whether the time
has come to adopt a new paradigm for Fourth Amendment law in the digital
age. There are several alternatives that avoid relying on inescapability and
that may be more effective than the current test. Even if it retains the existing
framework, the Court should reject inescapability as a measure of
constitutional protection. An inescapability standard threatens to eliminate
privacy rights in a wide variety of personal data. There is still time to choose
a better path for Fourth Amendment law.
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